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EDITORIAL 
 
COMPLIANCE IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 
 
We are pleased to present the latest issue of the Compliance Elliance Journal (“CEJ”). 
 
In this edition, we take a closer look at compliance in the healthcare industry, and focus 
on questions arising from the fast-growing healthcare compliance system. Our first set 
of articles explicitly deals with that issue.  
 
This edition begins with a piece called “Conflicts of Interest in Medicine and their Man-
agement – Current Challenges and Initiatives in Germany,” written by Dr. Cora Koch, 
Dr. Gisela Schott, Dr. David Klemperer, Dr. Thomas Lempert, Dr. Wolf-Dieter Lud-
wig and Dr. Klaus Lieb. The authors address the issue of conflicts of interest from a 
medical-scientific point of view. They uncover inherent risks of undue influences arising 
from conflicts of interest, which have consequences for healthcare. They outline the 
existing domestic developments relating to the management of conflicts of interest. 
Their main conclusion is that transparency is absolutely essential in order to prevent 
conflicts of interest. However, the authors admit that more research still remains to be 
done and that transparency might not be enough.  
 
In our second article, Mechthild Lambers and Dr. Hendrik Schneider explore the topic 
of university hospitals. The article focuses on special compliance risks in university hos-
pitals and the implementation of compliance measures in order to prevent corruption. 
The authors take a close look at the importance and role of conflicts of interest in this 
context.  
 
Thereafter, Bettina Irmscher depicts the “New Compliance Management System of the 
University Hospital Frankfurt, Germany.” The author illustrates the six tasks that neces-
sarily have to be met  in this Compliance Management System. 
 
This edition then turns to an article about the issues that arise when companies are 
asked to voluntarily comply with investigations. Dr. Thomas Kopp and Dr. Valentin 
Pfisterer deal with the concernment of German companies or German-based subsidiar-
ies by investigations conducted by regulatory or law enforcement authorities. In their 
piece “Between a Rock and a Hard Place – Legal Pitfalls of Voluntary Cooperation of 
German Companies with German and Foreign Regulatory and Law Enforcement Au-
thorities,” they expose the problems of informal requests and related voluntary coopera-
tion.  
 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 2   2016 
MICHELE DESTEFANO & DR. HENDRIK SCHNEIDER  |  EDITORIAL 
PAGE  2 
This article and the following report of the 5th Munich Compliance Talk are included in 
this edition as teasers for our upcoming edition that focuses on legal privilege and its 
variances around the world. This event and similar ones mark the recognition of the 
importance around legal privilege and underline the market’s relevancy in this area. 
 
This is followed by the proceedings of the 5th Munich Compliance Talk, which took 
place in this past April, written by Antonia Orterer and Theresa Albert. The authors 
provide their impressions of the expert conference, where the focus was set on the legal 
framework of legal privilege as well as on legal privilege from a company viewpoint. 
 
Finally Sara M. Klock describes her journey in LawWithoutWalls in developing a solu-
tion to compliance transgressions along the supply chain – an issue facing many interna-
tional corporations today. The law student at the University of Miami worked with 
experts, entrepreneurs, lawyers, and students from around the globe to find an adequate 
solution to this special compliance issues. She details her scholastic and personal learn-
ings in the “Student’s Corner.” 
 
With our best regards, 
 
 
 
Michele DeStefano & Dr. Hendrik Schneider 
Founders and Content Curators of CEJ 
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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE AND THEIR MAN-
AGEMENT – CURRENT CHALLENGES AND INITIATIVES IN 
GERMANY 
Cora Koch, Gisela Schott, David Klemperer, Thomas Lempert, Wolf-Dieter 
Ludwig & Klaus Lieb 
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ARZNEIMITTELBRIEF”, and as a representative of the European doctors’ organisa-
tion a member of the Management Board of the European Medicines Agency. He is a 
member of the German branch of the „no free lunch” organization MEZIS e.V.. 
ABSTRACT 
Conflicts of interest (COI) in healthcare have increasingly gained attention in the lay 
press as well as among healthcare professionals. COIs increase the risk of undue influence 
on professional decision-making and may have far-reaching consequences in healthcare. 
Therefore, it is essential to develop strategies to deal with such risk situations in order to 
prevent negative outcomes for patients and the health care system. This article describes 
recent research on COIs in Germany as well as initiatives aiming at more transparency 
and better management of COIs in Germany. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   A conflict of interest (COI) has been defined as a set of circumstances that creates a risk 
that a professional judgement or action regarding a primary interest will be unduly in-
fluenced by a secondary interest.1 In healthcare, the primary interest of a doctor or a 
medical researcher is the well-being of the patient – either directly when treating a pa-
tient or indirectly via valid research that benefits patients. Secondary interests can be of 
very different natures, from financial interests to interactions with industry and intellec-
tual interests such as the allegiance to a certain therapy. 
 
It is important to note that a COI represents a risk factor for biased decision-making. 
COIs do not necessarily lead to an influenced decision and they are not necessarily 
caused by wrongdoing. On the contrary, they are ubiquitous and often unavoidable. As 
such, they are not always an issue of compliance, neither in the strict sense of the word 
nor in a broader ethical sense. However, they can become an issue of compliance when 
they are not made transparent as required, or when they are not managed appropriately 
to reduce their risk of bias. 
 
In healthcare, COIs are a controversial topic, especially those arising from interactions 
between industry and physicians. These interactions constitute COIs because the indus-
try’s primary interest is profit and not the well-being of the patient. Industry may there-
fore influence professional medical decisions to the possible harm of patients. However, 
physician-industry interactions may also have beneficial effects when collaborations on 
research lead to the development of better therapeutic strategies. This leads to contro-
versy between those warning against negative consequences of industry interactions and 
those fearing obstacles for research if interactions are regulated too strictly. 
 
Interactions between industry and physicians are common,2 and there is a large body of 
evidence showing that these COIs may lead to decisions that are potentially harmful to 
patients. There is evidence that they may lead to higher prescriptions in general and 
specifically of patented drugs to the benefit of industry as well as to prescriptions not in 			
1
 Dennis F. Thompson, Understanding financial conflicts of interest, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF 
MEDICINE, 329 (1993) and  Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest 
in Medical Research, Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009). 
2
  Eric  G. Campbell, Doctors and drug companies--scrutinizing influential relationships, Dennis F. Thompson, 
Understanding financial conflicts of interest, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 357 (2007)., Eric  
G. Campbell et al., Institutional academic industry relationships, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION,  298 (2007)., Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician professionalism and changes in physician-
industry relationships from 2004 to 2009, ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, 170  (2010)., and Klaus Lieb & 
Simone Brandtönies, A survey of german physicians in private practice about contacts with pharmaceutical 
sales representatives, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL, 107 (2010). 
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line with clinical guidelines.3 In addition, associations with biased trial designs,4 biased 
publication of trial results5 and biased assessments of drug safety and efficacy6 have been 
found.7  
 
Financial COIs arising from interactions with industry have been the main focus of COI 
research and debate. However, it is important to note that COIs may also arise from 
non-financial interests, such as allegiance to a certain type of therapy, membership in 
professional societies, or individual research focus. There has been much less research 
into how these COIs might influence different aspects of medical doctors’ decision-
making.8 
 
Considering the importance of unbiased decision-making in healthcare, it is essential to 
develop strategies to prevent or at least reduce bias resulting from COIs. A growing 
body of literature addresses the adequate management of COIs in different areas of 
health care. One publication that was especially influential is the Institute of Medicines 
(IOM) report of 2009, “Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Prac-
tice” by Lo and Field.9 It gives an overview of COIs in healthcare and suggests strategies 
for their management in different contexts. It describes the ultimate goals of COI poli-
cies as “maintaining the integrity of professional judgment and sustaining public confi-
dence in that judgment”. 
 
Most COI research has been performed in the US, Australia and the UK. In Germany, 			
3
  Klaus Lieb & Armin Scheurich, Contact between Doctors and the Pharmaceutical Industry, Their 
Perceptions, and the Effects on Prescribing Habits, PLOS ONE , 9 (2014). and Geoffrey K. Spurling et al., 
Information from pharmaceutical companies and the quality, quantity, and cost of physicians' prescribing: A 
systematic review,  PLOS MEDICINE, 7 (2010). 
4
  Andreas Lundh et al., Industry sponsorship and research outcome, THE COCHRANE DATABASE OF 
SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, 12 (2012) , Maria E. Flacco et al., Head-to-head randomized trials are mostly industry 
sponsored and almost always favor the industry sponsor, JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY,  68 (2015). 
5
 Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and impact of financial conflicts of interest in biomedical research: a systematic 
review, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  289 (2003) and Gisela Schott et al., The 
financing of drug trials by pharmaceutical companies and its consequences. Part 1: A qualitative, systematic 
review of the literature on possible influences on the findings, protocols, and quality of drug trials,  
DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL , 107 (2010). 
6
  Amy T. Wang et al., Association between industry affiliation and position on cardiovascular risk with 
rosiglitazone: Cross sectional systematic review,  BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL,  340 (2010)  and Adam G. 
Dunn et al., Financial conflicts of interest and conclusions about neuraminidase inhibitors for influenza: an 
analysis of systematic reviews, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE,  161  (2014). 
7
  Lisa Cosgrove et al., Under the Influence: The Interplay among Industry, Publishing, and Drug Regulation, 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH,  23 (2016)  gives a good overview of the topic using a recent case study. 
8
  Alexander M. Clark et al., Addressing conflict of interest in non-pharmacological research, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PRACTICE, 69 (2015) , Klaus Lieb et al., Conflicts of interest and 
spin in reviews of psychological therapies: a systematic review, BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL OPEN, 6 (2016). 
9
  Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009). 
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COI research has only begun to gather momentum in the past few years. Initiatives such 
as the “no free lunch” 10 organization MEZIS, Transparency International and Neurolo-
gyFirst have additionally stimulated interest in the topic. This article will therefore focus 
on recent developments in Germany regarding COIs and their management in 
healthcare. 
 
We will start by giving an overview of research on the frequency of and attitudes toward 
COIs among physicians and medical students especially with regard to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry in Germany. Then, we will describe different initiatives that have made 
efforts to improve the management of COIs in healthcare in Germany. Such efforts 
have focused firstly on how to make COIs transparent, and secondly on how to develop 
adequate strategies to reduce their resulting bias.   
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE – SURVEY DATA FROM GER-
MANY 
 
   As mentioned above, most existing data on COIs in healthcare are from the US, Aus-
tralia and the UK. However, considering the differences in health care policy in different 
countries, research results from one country may not be representative of another. In 
recent years, there has been a growing number of German contributions to COI-
research.  In the following section, they will be discussed in the context of evidence from 
the above mentioned countries. 
 
A. Survey on Medical Professionals’ Interactions with Industry in Germany 
 
In Germany, the first survey of physicians’ interactions with pharmaceutical sales repre-
sentatives (PSRs) was done in 2006, funded by a trust associated with the professional 
society of registered doctors in Germany.11 While the response rate was low (11%), it had 
similar results to later independent surveys. German doctors were visited by PSRs on 
average seven times per week and most physicians (63%) considered these interactions to 
be valuable. The first independent study by our group in 2008 questioned 300 random-
ly selected doctors from a sample of cardiologists, neurologists/psychiatrists and primary 
care physicians (response rate 69.3%, n=208).12 Almost 80% of the surveyed doctors 
received at least one weekly visit from PSRs, while almost 20% received daily visits. Al-
most all doctors had received gifts and/or pharmaceutical samples from industry within 
the last year (96% and 92%, respectively). These percentages are higher than in the US, 
where in 2010, about 80% of surveyed doctors reported relationships with drug compa-			
10
  „No free lunch“ is an organization of healthcare providers that tries to encourage evidence-based prescribing 
independent of industry influence., see www.nofreelunch.org 
11
  KLAUS GEBUHR, DER PHARMAREFERENT IN DER BEWERTUNG DER VERTRAGSÄRZTESCHAFT (2008). 
12
  Klaus Lieb & Simone Brandtönies, A survey of german physicians in private practice about contacts with 
pharmaceutical sales representatives , DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL, 107  (2010). 
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nies and just over 60% of doctors reported receiving drug samples13. In this 2010 study, a 
trend of decreasing interactions in the US was reported compared with an earlier study 
from 2007.14 A similar trend has not been found in Germany, where a survey from 2011 
found similar rates to the previous one.15 
 
In Germany, most doctors in the 2008 survey stated that the PSRs were trying to influ-
ence their prescribing patterns most of the time. However, few doctors considered 
themselves to be influenced by PSRs, while they were more likely to believe this of their 
colleagues.16 This phenomenon of a so-called “bias blind spot” has been described in 
many other studies, where medical doctors consistently underestimate their own risk of 
being influenced by COIs.17 
 
Another German study focused on the impact of interactions between doctors and in-
dustry. An online survey by our group in 2011 asked 1,386 medical doctors (response rate 
11.5%; n = 160) with a prescription volume of > €100,000 (psychiatrists, neurologists, 
general practitioners or internal medicine specialists) or >€20,000 (cardiologists) per 
quarter about their interactions with industry in the previous year and correlated those 
interactions with their overall prescription data during the same time period.18 We 
found an association between the acceptance of office stationery, the attendance of 
sponsored continuing medical education (CME) events and the perception of being 
adequately and accurately informed by drug representatives with changes in overall 
prescription data of the doctors. The acceptance of office stationery was associated with 
prescriptions of higher daily doses per patient in general and more prescriptions of ge-
nerics.  Attendance at sponsored CME events was associated with the prescription of a 
higher proportion of on-patent branded drugs and a higher expenditure for off-patent 
branded drugs per patient. While this survey was not able to prove causality, it adds to 
the body of evidence suggesting that interactions with industry influences the prescrib-			
13
  Eric G. Campbell et al., Physician professionalism and changes in physician-industry relationships from 2004 
to 2009,  ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, 170 (2010). 
14
  Eric G. Campbell, Doctors and drug companies--scrutinizing influential relationships, THE NEW ENGLAND 
JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, 357 (2007). 
15
  Klaus Lieb & Armin Scheurich, Contact between Doctors and the Pharmaceutical Industry, Their 
Perceptions, and the Effects on Prescribing Habits,  PLOS ONE,  (2014). 
16
  Klaus Lieb & Simone Brandtönies, A survey of german physicians in private practice about contacts with 
pharmaceutical sales representatives , DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL, 107 (2010). 
17
  Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the bias blind spot: people's assessments of bias in themselves and others, 
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 31 (2005), Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the 
pharmaceutical industry: Is a gift ever just a gift?, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  
283 (2000)  and Daniella A. Zipkin & Michael A. Steinman, Interactions between pharmaceutical 
representatives and doctors in training. A thematic review, JOURNAL OF GENERAL INTERNAL MEDICINE,  
20 (2005). 
18
  Klaus Lieb & Armin Scheurich, Contact between Doctors and the Pharmaceutical Industry, Their 
Perceptions, and the Effects on Prescribing Habits,  PLOS ONE,  (2014). 
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ing behavior of physicians.19 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there have been only two studies on the interactions be-
tween medical students and industry in Germany. The first one conducted by our 
group in 2011 was a survey of 1,151 medical students at eight randomly selected German 
universities (response rate 90%).20 All but 12% of the students had received at least one 
gift from a pharmaceutical company or participated in an event sponsored by a pharma-
ceutical company. Most common gifts were small, non-informational gifts such as mugs 
or tourniquets (65%). Another simultaneous study that was done at only one German 
university showed similar results, with 80% of students having received some kind of 
gift from the pharmaceutical industry and 44% of students having had direct contact 
with a PSR.21 
 
Both surveys also assessed students’ attitudes toward these interactions. Both studies 
found that students found more expensive gifts less appropriate.22 In our study, almost 
half of the students considered it appropriate to accept gifts because the students be-
lieved that they have only minimal influence on them or because they considered them-
selves to be in a bad financial situation, respectively. We also found that students were 
more likely to believe that their fellow students were influenced by gifts than that they 
themselves were influenced by gifts, showing a blind spot in medical students compara-
ble to that in doctors. 40% of students considered sponsored educational events to be 
biased and at the same time helpful and informative.23 We also surveyed medical schools’ 
deans and student affairs’ deans regarding policies and lectures on COIs.24 Only one of 
36 medical schools in Germany had a policy governing the interactions between medical 
students and industry and only six schools (20%) offered lectures on the topic. Conse-
quently, we found that most students (77.8%) would like to learn more about interac-
tions with PSRs. 
 			
19
  Geoffrey K. Spurling et al., Information from pharmaceutical companies and the quality, quantity, and cost 
of physicians' prescribing: A systematic review, PLOS MEDICINE, 7 (2010), James S. Yeh et al., Association of 
Industry Payments to Physicians With the Prescribing of Brand-name Statins in Massachusetts,  THE 
JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION INTERNAL MEDICINE, 176 (2016). 
20
  Klaus Lieb & Cora Koch, Medical students' attitudes to and contact with the pharmaceutical industry: a 
survey at eight German university hospitals, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  110 (2013). 
21
  Kristine Jahnke et al., German medical students' exposure and attitudes toward pharmaceutical promotion: a 
cross-sectional survey, GMS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIZINISCHE AUSBILDUNG, 31 (2014). 
22
  Id. at. and Klaus Lieb & Cora Koch, Medical students' attitudes to and contact with the pharmaceutical 
industry: a survey at eight German university hospitals, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  110 
(2013). 
23
  Klaus Lieb & Cora Koch, Medical students' attitudes to and contact with the pharmaceutical industry: a 
survey at eight German university hospitals, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  110 (2013). 
24
  Klaus Lieb & Cora Koch, Conflicts of interest in medical school: missing policies and high need for student 
information at most German universities, GMS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR MEDIZINISCHE AUSBILDUNG,  31 (2014). 
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B. Survey of Patients’ Views on Medical Professionals’ Interactions with Indus-
try in Germany 
 
There has been generally little research on the awareness and attitudes of patients with 
regard to COIs of their treating physicians. In Germany, a survey conducted by our 
group in 2012/2013 shed some light on this topic.25 As expected, most of the 765 surveyed 
patients (response rate 80%; n = 612) said that it was important to them that decisions 
by their doctors were made only in their best interest. However, patients were generally 
not well informed about possible COIs their doctors could have and underestimated the 
frequency with which doctors interacted with PSRs. In addition, only very few patients 
expected that their doctor could be unduly influenced by COIs. Still, most patients 
would welcome transparency regarding COIs of their doctors and expected their trust in 
their doctors to increase if they were to disclose secondary interests.  
III. GERMAN INITIATIVES FOR IMPROVED TRANSPARENCY OF CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST FOR MEDICAL DOCTORS 
 
  The first and essential step in the management of COIs is to make them transparent, so 
that in turn, strategies can be developed to reduce the risk of bias resulting from them. 
Nevertheless, research has shown that COIs continue to be underreported in many con-
texts.26 In the US, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act (PPSA), as part of the Afforda-
ble Care Act, mandates the publication of payments from the pharmaceutical and medi-
cal device industry to physicians since 2012. The PPSA is one of the most prominent and 
largest transparency initiatives with regard to COIs in healthcare globally. Since its initi-
ation, it has published 15.71 million payments with a total value of 9.92 billion Dollars.27 
A similar law in Germany does not appear on the horizon. However, there are several 
German initiatives that have worked to increase transparency regarding COIs for medi-
cal doctors and medical advisors. We will describe steps that have been taken by the 
Drug Commission of the German Medical Association (DCGMA) as well as the Associ-
ation of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (VfA) in cooperation with the asso-
ciation Voluntary Self-regulation for the Pharmaceutical Industry (FSA). In addition, 
we will discuss how transparency with regard to non-financial COIs could be improved.  
 			
25
  Elena  M. Riedl et al., Patient attitudes and expectations towards conflicts of interest of attending physicians, 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR EVIDENZ, FORTBILDUNG UND QUALITÄT IM GESUNDHEITSWESEN,  110-111 Z (2016). 
26
  Michelle Roseman et al., Reporting of conflicts of interest in meta-analyses of trials of pharmacological 
treatments, THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 305 (2011), Michelle Roseman et al., 
Reporting of conflicts of interest from drug trials in Cochrane reviews: cross sectional study, BRITISH MEDICAL 
JOURNAL, 345 (2012), Shanil Ebrahim et al., Meta-analyses with industry involvement are massively published 
and report no caveats for antidepressants, JOURNAL OF CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY,  70 (2016). 
27
  Department of Health and Human Services and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Annual Report 
to Congress on the Open Payments Program (2016), available at 
https://www.cms.gov/OpenPayments/Downloads/Open-Payments-Report-to-Congress.pdf. 
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While transparency is a prerequisite for the better management of COIs, it is important 
to note that bias is not eliminated if hidden COIs are made transparent.28 Furthermore, 
it has been shown that the declaration of COIs may have negative consequences, e.g. by 
leading to a strategic exaggeration of bias by the person declaring the COI or by increas-
ing the burden on patients to follow their doctors’ recommendations so as not to appear 
to mistrust them.29 Nevertheless, if doctors declare their COIs, this openness about 
COIs may motivate them to reduce their COIs in the future.30 In sum, transparency can 
only be a first step of COI management and has to be followed by measures that are 
useful in reducing the resulting bias. 
 
A. The Drug Commission of the German Medical Association (DCGMA) 
 
The Drug Commission of the German Medical Association is a scientific expert com-
mittee of the German Medical Association (GMA) for drug-related matters. Its main 
tasks are to advise the GMA on questions of pharmaceutical policy, to assess benefits of 
pharmaceuticals, to document and assess adverse drug reactions and to keep the medical 
public up to date on rational drug therapy and drug safety.31 These important and influ-
ential tasks necessitate a high level of independence from secondary interests among the 
currently 37 full and 130 associate members. Within the DCGMA, the expert committee 
for transparency and independence in medicine aims to strengthen the independence of 
DCGMA members as well as the broader community of medical doctors.32 It was initi-
ated in 2014 and develops strategies to declare, prevent and manage conflicts of interest. 
Before this, the DCGMA had already begun to address COIs in a less formal working 
group established in 2003. 
 
It has been shown that COIs tend to be underreported if questioning is not specific 
enough or leaves the judgment of whether a secondary interest is relevant or not to the 
person declaring the secondary interests.33 To increase transparency of members’ COIs, 
the DCGMA has developed a questionnaire to register its members’ secondary interests 			
28
  Sheldon Krimsky, Combating the funding effect in science: What's beyond transparency?, STANFORD LAW 
POLICY REVIEW,  XXI (2010). 
29
  George Loewenstein et al., The limits of transparency: Pitfalls and potential of disclosing conflicts of interest, 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 101 (2011). 
30
  ARCHON FUNG et al., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY   (Cambridge 
University Press. 2007). 
31
       Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Drug Commission of the German Medical Association, 
available at http://www.akdae.de/en/index.html. 
32
   Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Expert Committee for Transparency and Independence 
in Medicine, available at 
http://www.akdae.de/Kommission/Organisation/Mitglieder/Fachausschuesse/Transparenz/eng/Transpare
ncy/index.html. 
33
  Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009). 
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based on the above-mentioned IOM-report. It asks for COIs arising from different 
types of interactions with “institutions”, defined as pharmaceutical or medical device 
companies, health insurance providers or other interest groups. Interactions that are 
asked for include employment, consultancy work, personal remuneration for lectures, 
CME events or authorship of scientific publications, third party funding for research, 
shares or patents, and active membership in professional associations, specialist societies, 
or other interest groups.34 
 
Since 2014, the COIs of the last three years of the current full and associate members are 
publicly accessible on the website of the DCGMA. The amount of payments received in 
2014 was additionally published for full members in 2015.35 The publication of the 
amount of payments received by associate members is planned in 2016 for the year 2015.  
These measures ensure a high degree of transparency not only among members but also 
for the public. Informing the public aims to increase public trust in the DCGMA. An 
unpublished analysis of the development of COIs over the last several years has shown 
that relationships between DCGMA members and the pharmaceutical industry have 
decreased considerably, underlining the successful work of the DCGMA in their efforts 
to decrease the number of members with COIs and confirming that transparency may 
decrease interactions with industry. 
 
As mentioned above, however, mere transparency does not prevent bias. The DCGMA 
has therefore developed ways to manage COIs that are described in more detail below. 
 
B. The Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (VfA) 
 
The Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (VfA) is a lobby group 
for German pharmaceutical manufacturers. It represents 45 member companies and 
over 100 of their subsidiaries, representing about 70% of the German pharmaceutical 
market.36 Its members have declared to abide by certain codes specified by the associa-
tion Voluntary Self-regulation for the Pharmaceutical Industry (FSA) concerning for 
example the interaction between the member companies with health care professionals 
or patient organizations. In 2013, a new “transparency codex” was published with the 
goal of bringing more transparency into interactions between pharmaceutical manufac-
turers and other cooperating partners within the health care system. This was a reaction 
to the announcement by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations (EFPIA) in 2012 to publish payments to doctors and other healthcare pro-			
34
  The questionnaire is available at 
http://www.akdae.de/Kommission/Organisation/Statuten/Interessenkonflikte/Interessenkonflikte.doc (in 
German) 
35
   Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Ordentliche Mitglieder, available at 
http://www.akdae.de/Kommission/Organisation/Mitglieder/OM/index.html. 
36
  Frank Gailberger, Verband und Mitglieder (2016), available at http://www.vfa.de/de/verband-mitglieder. 
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fessionals.37 
 
In June of 2016, the first disclosure report declared payments of € 575,000,000 to Ger-
man doctors and hospitals.38 Most, though not all, member companies have also pub-
lished their individual payments to doctors, where doctors consented to publication.39 
According to the VfA, only about one third of doctors consented to the publication of 
their data, but where consent was not given, aggregated anonymous data were pub-
lished.40  In principle, the transparency codex is similar to the PPSA: Pharmaceutical 
companies publish the payments they make to physicians or other health care profes-
sionals.41 The commitment is laudable, if it is well implemented. However, there are 
some important differences that make this codex less likely to succeed than the PPSA in 
arriving at full transparency of medical doctors` interactions with the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
 
The first and most obvious difference is that the German code is voluntary, whereas the 
PPSA is a law and therefore mandates publication of payments. It is therefore to be 
expected that companies will not establish full transparency.42 A study on the quality of 
non-interventional studies from 2012 found that member companies of the VfA only 
rarely complied with their own requirements for non-interventional studies.43 The VfA 
therefore does not have a trustable track record regarding compliance with its own rules. 
Additionally, the sanctions for non-compliance remain vague in the transparency codex 
of the FSA, further questioning the true commitment to transparency. Lastly, due to 
strict data protection laws in Germany, publication depends on the permission of indi-
vidual doctors that their data can be published. As mentioned above, about two thirds 
of doctors have refused to allow the publication of their data and it seems plausible to 
			
37
  Ärzte erhielten 2015 rund 575 Millionen Euro von Pharmafirmen, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT 2016 available 
at http://www.aerzteblatt.de/nachrichten/68213/#. 
38
  Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e.V., Pressemitteilung 015/2016: Transparenzkodex zeigt 
Forschungsstärke (2016), available at http://www.vfa.de/de/presse/pressemitteilungen/pm-015-2016-
transparenzkodex-zeigt-forschungsstaerke.html. 
39
  Holger Diener, Veröffentlichungen (2016), available at http://www.pharma-
transparenz.de/fachkreisangehoerige/veroeffentlichungen/. 
40
  Ärzte erhielten 2015 rund 575 Millionen Euro von Pharmafirmen, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT 2016. 
41
  FSA e.V., Code of Transparency of the Association of Voluntary Self-Control of the Pharmaceutical Industry 
(Verein Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle für die Arzneimittelindustrie - FSA) for interaction with Healthcare 
Professionals and Healthcare Organisations (2013), available at http://www.fsa-
pharma.de/fileadmin/Downloads/Pdf_s/Kodizes__Empfehlungen/Transparency_Code.pdf. 
42
  Margaret McCartney, Margaret McCartney: Optional disclosure of payments is pointless, BRITISH MEDICAL 
JOURNAL, 354 (2016). 
43
  Beatrice K. J. G. von Jeinsen & Thomas Sudhop, A 1-year cross-sectional analysis of non-interventional post-
marketing study protocols submitted to the German Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices 
(BfArM), THE EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1453, 69 (2013). 
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assume that these include those that have received high payments or have many COIs.44 
Consequently, a continued lack of full transparency regarding COI of individual doctors 
is likely. Even in the US, about 40% of the data remain unpublished because of unre-
solved disputes between doctors and industry.45 
 
Another disadvantage of the VfA/FSA transparency initiative is a practical one. While in 
the US, all data of payments to doctors are published on a single website 
(https://openpaymentsdata.cms.gov/), the FSA has compiled a list of links to individual 
company websites.46 This makes it time consuming to search for payments to specific 
doctors or to analyze the data for certain specialties (all payments made to cardiologists, 
for example), both important in bringing more transparency to the situation. 
 
Even if all member companies of the VfA/FSA comply with the transparency codex, 
there will still be a lack of transparency for those pharmaceutical companies which are 
not members of the VfA as well as all medical device manufacturers. While this is not a 
criticism of the VfA/FSA, as they have no control over non-members, it does illustrate 
the need for a legal basis for transparency if one aims to arrive at full transparency. 
  
On the other hand, considering that transparency is only a first step and can have unin-
tended negative consequences by itself,47 it is also important to consider the costs of 
such a transparency legislation. The implementation of full transparency through a legal 
mandate in Germany would be very expensive; the costs of the PPSA  have been esti-
mated at $269 million during the first year of implementation and at $180 million each 
following year.48  
 
In conclusion, while there are many critical points regarding the German FSA transpar-
ency codex, it is a positive first step towards more transparency, especially considering 
that at the moment, there is no better alternative in Germany. 
 
C. Transparency of Non-financial Conflicts of Interest 
 
While the transparency of financial COIs has markedly improved in pharmaceutical and 
medical device research within the last few years, non-financial COIs are declared less 
often. Their effect on research methodology or outcomes has also been researched less 			
44
  Nigel Hawkes, Doctors getting biggest payments from drug companies don't declare them on new website, 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL, 354 (2016). 
45
  Sachi Santhakumar & Eli Y. Adashi, The physician payment sunshine act: Testing the value of transparency, 
THE JOURNAL OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,  313 (2015). 
46
  Holger Diener, Veröffentlichungen (2016). 
47
 George Loewenstein et al., The Limits of Transparency: Pitfalls and Potential of Disclosing Conflicts of 
Interest, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 423  (2011). 
48
  Elizabeth Richardson et al., Health Policy Brief: The Physician Payments Sunshine Act, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
(2014). 
			
	  COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 2   2016 
CORA KOCH, GISELA SCHOTT, DAVID KLEMPERER, THOMAS LEMPERT, WOLF-DIETER LUDWIG & KLAUS LIEB |   
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN MEDICINE AND THEIR MANAGEMENT 
 
PAGE  16 
extensively.49 One area of research and practice where these types of COIs are relevant 
and have also been investigated in some detail is psychotherapy. In this context, alle-
giance to a certain type of psychotherapy constitutes a non-financial COI that might 
influence the framing of research questions, the interpretation of results, the decision to 
publish certain results and not others, or the type of psychotherapy recommended to a 
patient. Allegiance describes the belief that a certain treatment is superior.50 It may be 
due to training in this particular type of treatment or active involvement in the devel-
opment of an etiological model of this treatment, among other factors.51 Allegiance was 
shown to be associated with the outcome of psychotherapy studies with a moderate 
effect size in a large meta-meta-analysis by Munder and colleagues in 2013.52 
 
A recent study by our group investigated the transparency of non-financial COIs in 
reviews on the efficacy of psychological therapies and addressed the question whether 
these COIs influenced authors` interpretations of study results.53 Among the 95 reviews 
studied, only in 4 reviews (4.2%) were non-financial COIs declared, while on further 
analysis, non-financial COIs were found for authors of 34 (35.8%) of the reviews. The 
two main reasons for the under-reporting seemed to be that many journals do not re-
quire disclosure of non-financial COI at all (33/50 journals) and that those journals that 
did require such a disclosure rarely asked for a specific type of non-financial COI or gave 
examples. Additionally, because non-financial COIs have attracted less attention than 
financial ones, researchers might not realize the effect of non-financial COIs and there-
fore not consider it necessary to declare them. We further found that a biased interpreta-
tion of results (spin) was found in 28% of the studied reviews and that reviews with a 
conclusion in favor of psychological therapies (vs. pharmacological interventions) were 
at a high risk for spin in their conclusions (OR=8.31; 1.41 to 49.05). This might be inter-
preted as a hint that authors of psychological reviews (who are mostly psychotherapists) 
overestimate the effects of “their own” therapies. However, this has to be taken with 
caution because we only found a trend for an association of spin in review conclusions 
with researcher allegiance or the inclusion of own primary studies by the review authors 			
49
   Alexander M. Clark et al., Addressing conflict of interest in non-pharmacological research, THE 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CLINICAL PRACTICE, 69 (2015). 
50
  YAN LEYKIN & ROBERT  J. DERUBEIS, ALLEGIANCE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY OUTCOME RESEARCH: 
SEPARATING ASSOCIATION FROM BIAS (2009)  and Michael J Lambert, Are differential treatment effects 
inflated by researcher therapy allegiance? Could Clever Hans count?, CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SCIENCE AND 
PRACTICE , 6 (1999). 
51
  Elizabeth. A. Gaffan et al., Researcher allegiance and meta-analysis: the case of cognitive therapy for 
depression, THE JOURNAL OF CONSULTING AND CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY,  63 (1995) , Thomas  Munder et 
al., Testing the allegiance bias hypothesis: a meta-analysis, PSYCHOTHERAPY RESEARCH , 21 (2011) , and Scott 
Miller et al., Direct comparisons of treatment modalities for youth disorders: a meta-analysis, 18 see id. at  
(2008). 
52
  Thomas Munder et al., Researcher allegiance in psychotherapy outcome research: an overview of reviews, 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW, 33 (2013). 
53
  Klaus Lieb et al., Conflicts of interest and spin in reviews of psychological therapies: a systematic review, 
BRITISH MEDICAL JOURNAL OPEN,  (2016). 
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into the review. 
 
Considering that non-financial COIs may influence research conclusions similarly to 
financial COIs, it seems important to develop ways of improving their declaration. So 
far, there is no scientific consensus as to how non-financial interests should be declared 
or how best to ask for them. However, the scientific advisory board of psychotherapy 
(WBP) of the German medical association and the German Federal Chamber of Psycho-
therapists has recently recognized the need for such declarations. The WBP  is a scientific 
board made up of medical doctors and psychologists that advises government agencies 
on the scientific approval of specific psychotherapies as well as the federal approval of 
training institutions for psychotherapy.54 In 2015, it composed suggestions for how to 
declare the COIs of its members starting in 2016. These suggestions have not yet been 
published, but table 1 gives a list of our suggestions on how non-financial COIs should 
best be declared. 
 
Employment 
Allegiance 
• Psychotherapeutic method (e.g. analytical psychotherapy, psychodynamic psychothera-
py or behavior therapy) in which the declaring person is trained 
• Psychotherapeutic method which the declaring person uses in his/her own current psy-
chotherapeutic practice 
• Psychotherapeutic methods which are established in the institute which the declaring 
person heads (i.e. as a director or attending physician in a hospital) 
Activity/shares in an education/training institute for psychotherapy 
Cooperation/personal relationships with the pharmaceutical industry or medical device manufac-
turers (non-financial) 
Research 
• Subject of research (psychotherapeutic techniques/methods; research on other non-
pharmacological methods for treatment of mental disorders; and pharmacological re-
search). 
• Public and non-public funding of research activities (e.g. German research Foundation 
(DFG), Federal Ministry for Education and Research (BMBF), other foundations as well 
as pharmaceutical industry or medical device manufacturers) 
Other activities 
• Activities in professional societies, professional associations, institutions of self-
government, professional bodies, other thematically relevant associations, patient sup-
port groups or others. 
Table 1. Proposal for the declaration of non-financial COIs – here for psychotherapists and re-
searchers on psychotherapy 			
54
  Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Psychotherapie, Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Psychotherapie, available at 
http://www.wbpsychotherapie.de/. 
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IV. MANAGEMENT OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN GERMANY 
 
  In principle, avoiding COIs completely would be the best way to ensure that they do 
not unduly influence professional decision-making. Although this is impossible consid-
ering their sheer frequency and the beneficial effects of some COIs, it is important to 
motivate all medical doctors and researchers to avoid situations that create a COI wher-
ever possible.  The fact that it is not possible to avoid COIs completely should not dis-
tract from this intention. 
 
However, as some COIs are unavoidable, it is important to manage them in order to 
mitigate their negative influence on professional decision-making to the highest possible 
degree. As mentioned above, transparency is an essential step on the way to managing 
COIs, but is not in itself effective in preventing their influence.55 In Germany, steps have 
been taken in several different areas to manage COIs. Following, we will describe initia-
tives to reduce publication bias, bias in early benefit assessment of new therapeutic strat-
egies, bias in the development of guidelines and bias in continuing medical education 
(CME). 
 
A. Management of Publication Bias through the German Clinical Trials Register 
(DRKS) 
 
One of the most influential biases that result from COIs is publication bias. Because 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have an interest mainly in publishing positive trial re-
sults, many trials – around 50% – are never published. It has been shown that those 
trials with a positive outcome are more likely to be published.56 This leads to a skewed 
evidence base for the succeeding assessment of benefits and risks of therapeutic strategies 
which overestimates the benefits of these strategies and underestimates the risks. One 
way of trying to reduce this bias is to mandate registration of clinical trials. While this 
does not ensure that they will be published, it still has several advantages that help to 
mitigate publication bias. Firstly, it makes it possible to at least analyze which trials have 
not been published and to contact the authors for results of those trials, i.e. when au-
thoring a systematic review. Secondly, it is usually possible to publish the study results 
on registries if no journal publication has appeared. Thirdly, it is possible to track 			
55
 Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009), Holger. J. Schünemann et al., Guidelines 
International Network: Principles for Disclosure of Interests and Management of Conflicts in Guidelines, 
ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE, 163 (2015), and Klaus  Lieb, Transparency alone is not sufficient for the 
management of conflicts of interest - pro, PSYCHIATRISCHE PRAXIS 12, 42 (2015). 
56
  Annelieke M. Roest et al., Reporting Bias in Clinical Trials Investigating the Efficacy of Second-Generation 
Antidepressants in the Treatment of Anxiety Disorders: A Report of 2 Meta-analyses, THE JOURNAL OF 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION PSYCHIATRY, 72 (2015), Maria E. Flacco et al., Head-to-head 
randomized trials are mostly industry sponsored and almost always favor the industry sponsor, JOURNAL OF 
CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY,  (2015)  and Erick H. Turner et al., Selective publication of antidepressant trials 
and its influence on apparent efficacy, THE NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE,  358 (2008). 
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whether the (primary) outcomes of a trial that are published correspond with the prede-
fined outcomes mentioned in the registration. Adding, revising, or failing to publish 
certain outcomes of trials can skew the results available to the public and is quite a 
common practice.57 
 
In several countries, such as the US, Switzerland and India, it is therefore legally required 
to register all clinical trials. In Germany, this only applies to those clinical trials that are 
subject to the Medicines Act (AMG) or the Medical Device Act (MPG).58 However, 
since 2007 the possibility exists to register any clinical trial on the German Clinical Trials 
Register (DRKS), the WHO primary registry for Germany. It is a cooperation of the 
Department for Medical Biometrics and Medical Informatics of the University of Frei-
burg and was funded initially by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research 
(BMBF).59 Funding by the BMBF had to be discontinued by July 2016 due to the regula-
tions of the BMBF on project funding. At the time of writing, negotiations were un-
derway with the Federal Ministry of Health to find sustainable funding options for the 
DRKS.60 
 
For the management of publication bias, it is essential that the DRKS remains function-
ing. It is the only registry that gives an overview of clinical trials in Germany. It is there-
fore also a good resource for patients, practitioners and researchers in Germany who 
want to search the evidence regarding a certain condition or drug or who want to find 
trials that might offer patients access to novel therapies. The fact that all trials can be 
registered means that even trials that are not subject to the AMG/MPG can be searched. 
And because the DRKS offers the possibility to submit data even if there was no publi-
cation on a certain trial means that one can gain access to a broader evidence base than 
by simply searching usual medical publication databases. 
 
B. Management of Conflicts of Interest in the Evaluation of Drugs and Medical 
Devices by the DCGMA 
 
In Germany, the DCGMA is one of the few organizations that are authorized to com-
ment on the early benefit assessment of newly approved pharmaceuticals.61 This has 			
57
  Ben Goldacre et al., The COMPare Trials Project (2016). 
58
  Gesetzgeber, Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln - Arzneimittelgesetz  (1976, letzte Änderung 2014). 
and Gesetzgeber, Gesetz über Medizinprodukte (Medizinproduktegesetz - MPG),  (1994, letzte Änderung 
2015). 
59
  Susanne Jena, DRKS- Deutsches Register Klinischer Studien (German Clinical Trials Register), available at 
https://drks-neu.uniklinik-freiburg.de/drks_web/setLocale_EN.do. 
60
  Hinnerk Feldwisch-Drentrup, Gesundheitspolitiker wollen Studien-Register retten, DEUTSCHE APOTHEKER 
ZEITUNG, 2016. 
61
  Bundesministerium für Gesundheit, Bekanntmachung eines Beschlusses des Gemeinsamen Bundesausschusses 
über die Bestimmung von Stellungnahmeberechtigten nach §92 Absatz 3a des Fünften Buches Sozialgesetzbuch 
(SGB V), 58 BUNDESANZEIGER (2009). 
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direct repercussions for the ensuing price negotiations with the drug manufacturer and 
the definition of a price that will be refunded by statutory health insurance. As was 
described in detail above, the DCGMA has initiated a high level of transparency regard-
ing COIs. Taking this as a first step, the DCGMA has moved further to formulate rules 
for the management of COIs that are adapted from the suggestions of the 2009 IOM 
report.62 
 
The main principles of the DCGMA rules for managing COIs are to reduce the propor-
tion of members with COIs in regard to the pharmaceutical or therapeutic strategy be-
ing assessed and to reduce the amount of influence on decisions by conflicted members. 
With regard to the first point, the DCGMA aims to create a committee of members free 
of COIs when performing a benefit/risk analysis for a newly approved drug. Should this 
be impossible, at least the chairman of the committee has to be free of COIs for the last 
three years and the proportion of members with COIs should not exceed one third. The 
DCGMA does acknowledge that it might sometimes be necessary to include members 
with close industry contacts because of their expertise; in research, cooperation with 
industry is common and while leading to COIs, it may also have benefits. Excluding 
experts with COIs completely might therefore lead to a loss of scientific expertise. 
Members with very close personal relationships, such as members of speaking bureaus 
or shareholders in pharmaceutical companies, however, are excluded from the assess-
ments in any case. To reduce the amount of influence of members with COIs, they are 
not allowed to be part of the decision-making process and are not allowed to formulate 
the text of the final statement of the DCGMA regarding a new drug or medical device.63 
  
To decide whether a COI is relevant to the assessment of a drug, the DCGMA looks for 
relationships with the company producing the original drug, as well as companies pro-
ducing generic versions and all competitor companies. If a whole class of substances is 
being assessed, relationships with the corresponding companies are considered to be 
relevant. COIs of DCGMA members are evaluated by the board of directors of the 
DCGMA. As mentioned above, physicians tend to underestimate their own bias, so it is 
essential that a third party judges the relevance of a COI for the respective task.64 
 
In sum, DCGMA rules try to ensure a balance between ensuring access to all relevant 
expertise, while guarding a distance between possibly biased members and decision-
making so that decisions remain as free as possible from undue influence. 			
62
 Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009) and Arzneimittelkommission der 
deutschen Ärzteschaft, Regeln zum Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei Mitgliedern der 
Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft (2014) available  at 
http://www.akdae.de/Kommission/Organisation/Statuten/Interessenkonflikte/Regeln.pdf. 
63
   Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Regeln zum Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei 
Mitgliedern der Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft  (2014). 
64
  Id. at. 
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C. Management of Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Guidelines 
 
Guidelines are some of the most influential documents in health care, as they inform 
doctors’ decisions regarding diagnostic and treatment strategies. Non-adherence may 
have legal consequences as guidelines are often used as the basis for arguments in mal-
practice suits. It therefore seems obvious that it is important to keep guidelines free from 
bias caused by secondary interests. 
 
There are some international data to suggest that guidelines can be influenced when 
authors have COIs.65 In Germany, studies have been published that assessed transparen-
cy of COIs of guideline panel members in German guidelines66 and possible bias in 
current guidelines through panel members with conflicting interests.67 Guideline devel-
opment in Germany is coordinated by the Association of Scientific Medical Societies 
(AWMF), and rules for the declaration of COIs were released in 2010.68 A study by 
Langer and colleagues in 2012 found that among guidelines published between 2009 and 
2011, the frequency of declarations of COIs increased markedly from 8% to about 94% 
after the rules had taken effect.69 However, only 50% of guidelines described assessing 
the relevance of COIs; and in most cases, the authors of the guidelines rated the rele-
vance of their own COIs. Only one of the studied guidelines described how the risk of 
bias through COIs was minimized. Another study by our own group assessed guidelines 
that resulted from a less formal process of expert consensus (so called S1 guidelines) that 
were released after 2010.70 In more than 90% of the guidelines, COI declarations were 
given; COIs were most commonly memberships in a specialist society or professional 
association and 50% of experts had declared financial COIs. However, only 11% of the 
guidelines described assessing the declared COIs and only in one case did a COI lead to 
consequences for the conflicted member. 			
65
 See Lorraine Johnson & Raphael B. Stricker, Attorney General forces Infectious Diseases Society of America 
to redo Lyme guidelines due to flawed development process, JOURNAL OF MEDICAL ETHICS,  35 (2009)  and 
Paivi Hietanen, Does the expert panel at the St Gallen meeting provide an unbiased opinion about the 
management of women with early breast cancer?, ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY,  20 (2009)  for recent examples. 
66
  Thomas Langer et al., Conflicts of interest among authors of medical guidelines: an analysis of guidelines 
produced by German specialist societies, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  109 (2012) and  Gisela 
Schott et al., Does the pharmaceutical industry influence guidelines? Two examples from Germany, 
DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL, 110 (2013). 
67
  Gisela Schott et al., Deklaration und Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten in deutschen Leitlinien,  DEUTSCHES 
ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL, 112 (2013). 
68
  Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wissenschaftlicher Medizinischer Fachgesellschaften (AMWF), Empfehlungen zum 
Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei Fachgesellschaften (2010), available at http://www.awmf.org/medizin-
versorgung/stellungnahmen/umgang-mit-interessenkonflikten.html. 
69
  Thomas Langer et al., Interessenkonflikte bei Autoren medizinischer Leitlinien, DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT 
INTERNATIONAL, 109 (2012). 
70
  Gisela  Schott et al., Declaration and Handling of Conflicts of Interest in Guidelines: A Study of S1 
Guidelines From German Specialist Societies From 2010-2013, 112 see id. at (2015). 
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Another study of our group demonstrated that the German clinical practice guideline 
for psoriasis vulgaris gives a stronger recommendation for the use of efalizumab and 
considers the evidence base to be better than guidelines developed by more independent 
institutions.71 This correlated with the fact that many of the German authors contrib-
uting to the guideline had financial COIs with regard to efalizumab. While this study 
did not prove causality of influence of COI on the guideline, it does suggest that authors 
with COI give different recommendations than those without, to the possible detriment 
of patients. 
 
The initiative “Leitlinienwatch”72 has started to rate the transparency and management 
of COIs in guidelines published by the AWMF.  The initiative assesses guidelines with 
regard to transparency, proportion of members of the guideline group with COIs, inde-
pendence of the lead authors, chairmen and coordinators, abstention from voting by 
members with COI and external review of the guideline by the scientific public or pa-
tient representatives. In addition, they give “bonus points” when further measures to 
reduce bias through COIs have been documented, such as a search for authors without 
COIs, a system of assessment of COIs, etc.  Of the 116 guidelines that have so far been 
assessed, only 11 guidelines received a rating of “good” (the best rating), while 53 guide-
lines received a rating of “reform necessary”.73 However, this sample is not representative 
of the 755 guidelines that are in effect, the method has not been validated or scientifically 
published and does not cover all efforts by the AWMF to reduce bias. 
 
In conclusion, while there has been progress on the transparency of COIs in guideline 
development in Germany, there is still a lot of work to be done regarding their manage-
ment. 
 
The 2010 rules of the AWMF regarding the management of COIs in guideline develop-
ment were a good step toward better management but remain rather unspecific.74 They 
recommend that members of a guideline development group with a relevant COI 
should not participate in the decision making process. However, it is relatively vague 
who should assess the relevance of a COI and what the criteria for such relevance are. 
The rules also suggest that authors of guidelines should only have COIs with a small 
potential for bias, though how this judgment is made also remains unclear. The current 
rules are therefore under revision and the AWMF is planning to model new rules on the 			
71
  Gisela Schott et al., Deklaration und Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten in deutschen Leitlinien, DEUTSCHES 
ÄRZTEBLATT INTERNATIONAL,  112 (2013). 
72
  Leitlinienwatch. Das Transparenzportal für medizinische Behandlungsleitlinien, available at 
www.leitlinienwatch.de. 
73
  Id. at., accessed July 14th 2016. 
74
  The rules formulated concerning transparency are more specific and there is little to criticize in this regard.  
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Wissenschaftlicher Medizinischer Fachgesellschaften (AMWF), Empfehlungen zum 
Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei Fachgesellschaften (2010).  
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recommendations of the Guidelines International Network (GIN) that have recently 
been published75. At the time of writing, the new rules were not yet published. There-
fore, following we will give some recommendations to refine the AWMF rules based on 
the GIN-recommendations,76 the recommendations of the IOM77 as well as the 
DCGMA rules.78 
 
Firstly, medical specialist societies should make every effort to find experts for the devel-
opment of guidelines that are free of COIs, similar to the commitment made by the 
DCGMA and as recommended by GIN. This will lead to an emphasis on independence 
from the very beginning of the process. Similarly, it is essential to define the proportion 
of members of a guideline development group that must be free of COIs to ensure a 
balance between conflicted members and those without conflicts, as recommended by 
the IOM and the DCGMA. Secondly, special effort should be made to find guideline 
coordinators who are free of COIs. Some might criticize that it is not possible to find 
such a coordinator; however, this is mostly based on the argument that those with con-
siderable research expertise often have COIs. We believe that those experts with primari-
ly clinical experience have just as much to add to the development of guidelines, while 
being conflicted less often. Members with research experience and COIs are welcome to 
add their expertise in the role of external advisers, but should not be in a leadership posi-
tion. Thirdly, it is important to ensure that no guideline panel member assesses his or 
her own COIs, as most people tend to underestimate their own bias.79 It would make 
sense to establish a panel within the AWMF that assesses the COIs of guideline-
coordinators. In turn, coordinators free of COIs could then decide to appoint members 
within the guideline development group or outside of it as “COI-managers”, who would 
be in charge of assessing COIs and implementing rules for the management of COIs, as 
was suggested by the GIN. Fourthly, we would welcome the establishment of a system 
of “grading” COIs as to their severity, meaning the likelihood that they will lead to un-
due influence on decision making.  This could then have different consequences, i.e. 
members with very severe COIs could be completely excluded from the panel while 
members with COIs that are unlikely to lead to a relevant bias might only be excluded 
from leadership positions within the guideline development group while being allowed 
to participate in discussions. 
 
 			
75
  Holger J. Schünemann et al.,  Guidelines International Network: Principles for Disclosure of Interests and 
Management of Conflicts in Guidelines, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE,  (2015). 
76
  Id. at. 
77
  Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field, Free Executive Summary, in Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, 
Education, and Practice (Bernard Lo & Marilyn  J. Field eds., 2009). 
78
   Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft, Regeln zum Umgang mit Interessenkonflikten bei 
Mitgliedern der Arzneimittelkommission der deutschen Ärzteschaft  (2014). 
79
  Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People's Assessments of Bias in Themselves and 
Others, PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 680 (2005). 
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D. Management of Conflicts of Interest in Continuing Medical Education 
 
Globally, around 33% of all accredited events in continuing medical education (CME) 
are funded by pharmaceutical companies.80 For Germany, there are no exact figures, but 
many CME-events are funded at least in part by pharmaceutical or medical device man-
ufacturers, and often the speakers involved have financial COIs even if the event is not 
sponsored by a company. In both cases, the risk is increased that speakers will present 
biased information.81 
 
In Germany, CME has to be accredited by the state medical associations. There is a 
guideline on accreditation that mentions that the content of the event has to be inde-
pendent from “economic interests” as a prerequisite for accreditation.82 COIs of the or-
ganizer, the scientific supervisor and the speakers have to be declared to the medical 
associations and the event’s participants. However, these rules are relatively vague on 
how the influence of CME content by economic interests is to be avoided. For doctors it 
is therefore currently difficult to recognize which events are truly independent. 
 
The DCGMA is one organization that regularly organizes CME events and in 2015 initi-
ated rules to ensure their independence.83 These rules are stricter than internationally 
proposed suggestions regarding the independence of CME.84 One of the main require-
ments for a CME event to be considered independent by the DCGMA is that it is spon-
sored neither directly nor indirectly by a pharmaceutical or medical device manufactur-
er. Indirect sponsoring describes when a pharmaceutical manufacturer transfers funds to 
an organization or a hospital, which in turn organizes the CME event, instead of organ-
izing the event directly. The second important requirement is that speakers have not 
received personal remuneration from a pharmaceutical or medical device manufacturer 
for at least two years. It is important to note that an exception is made for speakers who 
have research relationships with industry and have therefore received funding from 
industry. In this case, it is important that the funds were/are only used for research, that 			
80
  Julie Simper, Cologne Consensus Conference, Management of conflict of interest, 12 and 13 September 2014, 
Cologne, Germany, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN CME, 4 (2015). 
81
  Nils Schneider et al., Interessenkonflikte in der ärztlichen Aus-, Weiter- und Fortbildung und Vorschläge zu 
deren Minimierung, in Interessenkonflikte in der Medizin. Hintergründe und Lösungsmöglichkeiten. 
(Klaus Lieb et al. eds., 2011). 
82
 Bundesärztekammer, (Muster-)Fortbildungsordnung 2013 (2013), available at 
http://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/_Muster-
_Fortbildungsordnung_29052013.pdf. 
83
  Klaus Lieb, Regeln für unabhängige ärztliche AkdÄ-Fortbildungsveranstaltungen (2015), available at 
http://www.akdae.de/Fortbildung/Regeln.pdf. 
84
  Julie Simper, Cologne Consensus Conference, Management of conflict of interest, 12 and 13 September 2014, 
Cologne, Germany, JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN CME, 4 (2015)  describes examples by the American Accredita-
tion Council for CME (ACCME) and Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons in Canada. 
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they were/are managed by third party funding accounts and that no money has gone to 
the speaker personally. While this type of cooperation also creates COIs, speakers that 
have research experience also bring valuable expertise to a CME event. In this case, the 
DCGMA judges that it is worth taking the risk of bias to profit from the expertise of 
these speakers. Additionally, the DCGMA has defined rules to ensure that the content 
of an event be as balanced as possible. These rules are modeled after suggestions by Lo 
and Ott.85 Speakers should: 
 
• Discuss all alternative therapeutic strategies (including generic medication and 
life style changes, among others) 
• Describe systematic reviews, meta-analyses and recommendations by independ-
ent institutions as evidence base 
• Describe advantages and disadvantages of the discussed therapeutic strategies  
• Mention limitations of the evidence base  
• Not use presentations or suggestions for talks designed by a pharmaceuti-
cal/medical device manufacturer. 
 
Lastly, the DCGMA requires speakers to declare their COIs during the event, with ade-
quate time for the participants to discuss these COIs and their relevance. In addition, 
the scientific supervisor of the event is required to let the participants evaluate the event, 
including an evaluation of its potential bias. 
 
While it is unclear whether such strict rules can be implemented within all CME events, 
it is important that the DCGMA has taken this step to ensure the independence of their 
events. We hope that this will influence other CME organizers to reconsider their rules 
with regard to the management of COIs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
To summarize, there are several promising developments in Germany regarding the 
management of COIs. Especially the transparency of COIs has improved markedly with-
in the last few years, at least in some organizations such as the DCGMA and the 
AWMF. Research has begun to shed some light on the frequency of doctor-industry 
interactions in Germany. Other parties have begun to follow the lead set by the 
DCGMA requiring a high level of transparency from their members and the AWMF’s 
approach of improving transparency of COIs in guideline-development. Even many 
pharmaceutical manufacturers have advocated a higher level of transparency, which is a 
welcome development despite several flaws of their proposal. 
 
The management of COIs has also made progress, but there still remains a lot to be 			
85
  Bernard Lo & Chelsea Ott, What is the enemy in CME, conflicts of interest or bias?,  THE JOURNAL OF 
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, 310 (2013). 
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done. However, the DCGMA has taken on an important role in this domain as well, 
serving as an example in their early benefit assessment as well as in the organization of 
CME. It remains to be seen whether the ideas of the DCGMA on independent CME 
will have a positive impact on the broader CME-community; this would be an essential 
step forward and help doctors to base their decisions on evidence-based information. 
Further developments from the AWMF and the WBP concerning management of COIs 
and transparency of non-financial COIs will hopefully be finalized soon, adding to the 
momentum towards more evidence-based decision-making in medicine in Germany. 
While the future of the German Clinical Trials Register is uncertain at the moment, one 
can hope that when sustainable funding is secured, it can continue to diminish publica-
tion bias in Germany.  
 
There are still many areas of healthcare in Germany where COIs remain unaddressed, 
however. Transparency in regard to medical device manufacturers remains extremely 
low; there has been no self-regulation regarding transparency in this area. Similarly, 
there has been little effort to address COIs in early medical education, even though our 
survey showed that medical students already interact with the pharmaceutical industry. 
Non-financial COIs have also barely been addressed outside of psychotherapy and much 
work remains to be done on improving their transparency, for example by developing 
better survey instruments. Even less explored has been the question of management of 
non-financial COIs. While in some cases, strategies similar to the ones used for financial 
COIs can be used to reduce bias, in other cases, new strategies will have to be developed. 
All in all, Germany is catching up with the international COI-discussion. The current 
developments raise hopes that medical professionals will continue to strengthen their 
independence from secondary interests to the benefit of the patients that depend on 
their expertise. 
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I. COMPLIANCE RISKS OF A UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
 
   In light of the demanding requirements inherent to the operation of a university hos-
pital, a multitude of compliance risks are entailed in the medical care, training, and re-
search entail which such institutions are engaged in. If such risks materialize, the public 
will notice, which will substantially tarnish not only the public’s confidence in the prop-
er functioning and the integrity of the impacted hospital, but ultimately, the whole 
German health care system. In examining the structural and requisite prevention proto-
cols, three risk groups can be distinguished. The Düsseldorf University Hospital pro-
vides a leading example in the area of compliance management.1 
 
To begin with, compliance risks originate out of deficiencies in both process and control 
mechanisms, which—contingent upon the remoteness of the participating personnel—
may lead to criminal liability in a negligence tort. Associated with this group of compli-
ance risks are (among others) the following situations: the inadequate observation of 
hygienic protocols2; deficiencies in the sterilization of medical equipment3; informed 
consent4 and other documentation concerns5; medical malpractice; the negligent author-
ization of access to patient records via records management software (hospital infor-
mation systems)6; and the billing of foreign doctors whose professional license ( §10 
BÄO) has expired.7 
 
The next risk group principally arises as a result of ignorance of the boundaries of crimi-
nal and/or civil law, and the corresponding social and professional rules of conduct; this 
also plays into the fact-finding phase of legal action, regarding the material facts required 			
1
 See Hendrik Schneider, Kevin Grau & Kristin Kißling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!“ Ergebnisse eines 
empirischen Forschungsvorhabens zu Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und der Pharmaindustrie, CORPO-
RATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT  48, 48 (2013). 
2
 Case example: Birgit Hibbeler, Hygiene-Skandal in Bremen: Auf der Suche nach den Schuldigen, 108 (48) 
DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT A-2586 (2011). 
3
 Peter T. Schmidt, Klinik-Skandal: Zwei weitere Manager suspendiert, MÜNCHNER MERKUR (July 09, 
2010), available at http://www.merkur-online.de/lokales/muenchen/klink-skandal-zwei-weitere-manager-
suspendiert-835703.html (Sept. 15, 2014). 
4
 Kokularajah Paheenthararajah, Christian Hick & Axel Karenberg, Medizinprodukteberater im Opera-
tionssaal: Patientenaufklärung erforderlich, 110 (46) DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT A-2190 (2013). 
5
  Jutta Rippegather, Rhön-Klinikum in der Kritik, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (Nov. 14,  2009), available 
at http://www.fr-online.de/rhoen-klinikum-marburg/behandlungsfehler-rhoen-klinikum-in-der-
kritik,2641638,4431464.html (Sept. 15, 2014). 
6
  Compare Michael Schumacher: Diebe bieten Krankenakte zum Kauf an, SPIEGEL-ONLINE, (June 24, 2014), 
available at http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/leute/michael-schumacher-krankenakte-gestohlen-und-zum-
kauf-angeboten-a-976999.html (Sept.5, 2014). 
7
 Wanja Andreas Welke, Zum strafrechtlichen Risiko der Tätigkeit angestellter Mediziner ohne 
Berufsausübungserlaubnis (Approbation) an Krankenhäusern, Heft 5 GESUNDHEITSRECHT 269, 269 (2011). 
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to prove an offense or claim. 
 
This case group is a result of the increasing legal regulation of medicine8 and the devel-
opment of advancing evolution of commercial law. This development is a concise, albeit 
not sharply contoured, legal concept.9 For example, these types of risks crop up when 
professors and senior physicians work in collaboration with representatives from the 
pharmaceutical and medical instrument industries. The collaboration between medical 
staff and the various actors present in the pharmaceutical and medical instrument indus-
tries is critical to medical advancement. This is especially true in the context of university 
hospitals engaged in research projects. However, both these justifications may lead to 
conflicts of interest.10 Lucrative contracting possibilities may present professionals in the 
field with incentives to promote and use certain pharmaceutical products (for example 
consulting agreements with medical corporations which participate in medical research) 
or medical devices (for example, sponsorships provided by medical specialists’ associa-
tions, grants for continuing medical education, or corporate promotions which lend 
medical facilities medical equipment for specified projects).11 
 
In relation to this compliance concern, it must be noted that university physicians, so 
called “Key Opinion Leaders”12, are highly sought after in the medical industry. They 
play a decisive role in determining medical guidelines regarding recommended therapeu-
tic approaches in medical care. Furthermore, they contribute to leading, influential med-
ical publications, and through the lecture circuit they influence current methodologies 
and procedures in the medical field. It should be noted that raising funds from third-
parties is expected from tenured professors active in research through the university; this 			
8
  Compare Gernot Steinhilper, „Kriminogene“ Normgebung oder mangelnde Kontrolle? – Kriminalpolitische 
Überlegungen zur Eindämmung ärztliche Abrechnungsbetruges, in Kriminalpolitik und ihre wissenschaft-
lichen Grundlagen, Festschrift für Professor Dr. Hans-Dieter Schwind zum 70. Geburtstag 163 (Thomas 
Feltes et al eds., 2006); in addition Adolf Laufs, Die jüngere Entwicklung des Arztberufs im Spiegel des 
Rechts, in Das Bild des Arztes im 21. Jahrhundert 18 (Christian Katzenmeier & Klaus Bergdolt, 2009). 
9
 Hendrik Schneider, Wachstumsbremse Wirtschaftsstrafrecht, Heft 1, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK 30, 32, (2012); 
additionally Hendrik Schneider, Kriminalpolitische Grundlagen des Wirtschaftsstrafrechts, in 
Wirtschaftsstrafrecht 48 (Hauke Brettel & Hendrik Schneider, 1st ed. 2014).  
10
 International MARC RODWIN, CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE UNITED 
STATES, FRANCE AND JAPAN (2013); for Germany KLAUS LIEB, DAVID KLEMPERER & WOLF-DIETER 
LUDWIG, INTERESSENKONFLIKTE IN DER MEDIZIN: HINTERGRÜNDE UND LÖSUNGSMÖGLICHKEITEN, 
(2011); Klaus Lieb et al., Interessenkonflikte in der Medizin: Mit Transparenz Vertrauen stärken, 108 (6) 
DEUTSCHES ÄRZTEBLATT A-256 (2011). 
11
 Compare specifically Hendrik Schneider in Korruptionsprävention im Gesundheitswesen (Susanne Boemke 
& Hendrik Schneider, 1st ed. 2011). 
12
 This is particularly instructive insofar as all published decisions on the corruption in the field of health care 
affect all university clinic health providers; BGH; judgment from 2/25/2003, Az: V StR 363/02, NEUE 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT-RR 171, 172 (2003); BGH, judgement from 10/23/2002, Az.: I StR 541/01, 
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 763, 764 (2003); OLG Karlsruhe, decision from 3/30/2000, Az: II Ws 
181/199, STRAFVERTEIDIGER 288, 290 (2001); OLG Hamburg, decision from 1/14/2000, Az.: II Ws 243/99, 
MEDIZINRECHT 371, 373 (2000). 
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compels collaboration between researchers, and corporations in the medical industry. 
Section 25 of the German federal regulations governing universities (Ger.: 
Hochschulrahmengesetz) and their respective state regulations specifically contemplate a 
funding scheme which permits tenured professors to execute research projects which are 
financed using third-party funds as opposed to ordinary budgetary funds.13 To this end, 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) higher education policies call for and encourage re-
search to be sponsored by third-party funding, which are to be allocated based on merit 
(Ger: leistungsorientierte Mittelverteilung [LOM]). To fund their operating costs (Ger: 
Zuführungsbetrag) NRW gives separate grants to universities engaged in medical re-
search.14 NRW’s Department for Innovation, Science, and Research appropriates a por-
tion of this Zuführungsbetrag based on certain merit-criteria, among which are third-
party funding and publications.15 This scheme creates a situation where the type and 
amount of third-party funding becomes a factor which appeal proceedings will consider. 
 
Within the scope of applicable malpractice law (§§ 331 ff. StGB), the boundaries between 
permissible and desirable cooperation and punishable corruption are fluid and legally 
uncertain. This is also the case for the acquisition of third-party funding, which is a 
crucial source for medical practices. In fact the German Supreme Court (Ger: Bun-
desgerichtshof [BGH]) has established case law concerning this issue.16 The holdings of 
these precedential cases and their ramifications are, however, not always familiar to doc-
tors in the field. Therefore, it is difficult to rule out that tenured professors or other 
doctors employed in university hospitals may acquire third-party funding pro-
posals/projects from nonprofit organizations—which are outside the control of the 
university hospital—or other corresponding corporations. Such funding arrangements 
may lie outside the parameters outlined by the BGH for acceptable industry-funded 
research schemes. In accordance with the BGH’s decisive holding on May 23, 2002, the 
acquisition of third-party funding is legally unobjectionable only if the faculty member 
has satisfactorily observed the regulations governing universities.17 
 
With nearly 5,000 personnel and 300 trainees on staff at Düsseldorf University Hospital 
at the end of 2013, it is difficult to exclude that intentional torts may be committed by 
tortfeasors who realize the unlawful nature of such actions. The risk of genuine, inten-
tional torts presents the third type of conceivable compliance-risks university hospitals 			
13
 Compare for NRW. § 71, paragraph 1 HG NRW. 
14
 § 31b HG NRW. 
15
http://www.wissenschaft.nrw.de/hochschule/hochschulen-in-nrw/hochschulmedizin/leistungsorientierte-
mittel-lom-in-der-medizin/. 
16
 BGH, judgment from 3/23/2002 (LG Heidelberg), Az.: I StR 372/01, BGHSt 47, 295 (300); Brigitte Tag, 
Drittmitteleinwerbung – strafbare Dienstpflicht? – Überlegungen zur Novellierung des Straftatbestandes der 
Vorteilsannahme JURISTISCHE RUNDSCHAU 50, 52 (2004); Torsten Verrel, Überkriminalisierung oder Über-
treibung? MEDIZINRECHT 319, 323 (2003). 
17
 Hans Kudlich, Strafbare Erfüllung einer Dienstpflicht? Strafrechtliche Risiken bei der Einwerbung von 
Drittmitteln, FORSCHUNG & LEHRE 106, 107 (2014). 
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must contend with. This risk brings harm not only to the university hospital, but also to 
involved third-parties. Theft and embezzlement of company property, including medi-
cation and anesthesia, are the typical case configurations facing a university hospital. 
With reference to characteristic risks involving third-parties are, for instance, the under-
lying circumstances surrounding organ transplant investigation files, embezzlement of 
funds or resources appropriated by the hospital or third-parties, or fraudulent account-
ing practices to the detriment of either the national healthcare system18 or the privately-
insured patient. 
 
The underlying case configurations of organ transplant scandals evidence the presence 
of an autocratic management structure that may emerge in a university hospital. Such a 
management style may produce what could be termed a bottom-up power vacuum. Fear 
of repression or concern for their own careers may discourage lower associates from 
reporting the misconduct of leading, high-ranking hospital staff to senior management 
of the university hospital—the illusion of a class of untouchables19.20 This phenomena 
could be counteracted by whistleblower policies and protections (for example CIRS, or 
complaint management) that would provide avenues to anonymously report incidents 
to hospital senior management or compliance-authorities. 
 
These specters facing a university hospital has been diagramed below in Table 1 (“Triad 
of Compliance Risks”). 
 
Compliance Risk Attributes Explanations Example 
1. Process and 
Control defi-
ciencies 
Negligence, missing 
monitoring (for 
example, because of 
downsizing), or 
fateful coherences 
cause damages on 
legal rights 
Inconsistent ob-
servance of internal 
guidelines, deficits 
in the monitoring 
and enforcement of 
process standards 
and regulations, 
problematic out-
sourcing 
A hospital allows 
an external compa-
ny to perform the 
sterilization of 
medical equipment 
and tools. It leads 
to serious irregular-
ities and hygiene 
defects. 			
18
 Hendrik Schneider & Claudia Reich, Abrechnungsbetrug durch „Upcoding“ Ein Beitrag zu den Fallgruppen 
der „konkludenten Täuschung“ im Straftatbestand des Betruges, ONLINEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR HÖCHSTRICH-
TERLICHE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM STRAFRECHT 267, 268 (2012). 
19
 On the criminological background see HENDRIK SCHNEIDER & DIETER JOHN, DAS UNTERNEHMEN ALS 
OPFER VON WIRTSCHAFTSKRIMINALITÄT, EINE VIKTIMOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG; PUBLIC UND 
PRIVATE SECTOR IM VERGLEICH (1st ed., 2013). 
20
 Compare the decision of the OLG Braunschweig from 3/20/2013, Az: I Ws 49/13, RDG 2013, 288 (291) (A 
decision about the further applications of § 310, paragraph 1 Nr. 1 StPO against pretrial detention ordinance 
in Göttinger proceeding) as evidenced by the reported facts that employees responded to lower hierarchical 
levels and concerning evidence tampering relating to a Euro-transplant to message-type data to her supervisor 
and had been appeased with the commentary that they should stay relaxed, that it would eventually help 
humanly. “This is a medical ordinance which they must follow.” A further message to the clinic- or universi-
ty upper management board remained. 
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2. Ignorance of 
the boundaries 
of  criminal and 
civil law and 
their adjoining 
rules concerning 
social and pro-
fessional con-
duct, which are 
referential to 
the material 
facts required to 
prove a criminal 
offense or a civil 
infraction 
Criminality arises 
because the legal 
parameters of per-
missible medical 
and economic ac-
tivities were not 
communicated in a 
complete or under-
standable fashion 
 
 
Increasing codifica-
tion of the medical 
field, and the pro-
gressive evolution 
of white collar 
crime with core 
legal concepts and 
definitions, which 
are, though, not 
distinctly con-
toured 
University Profes-
sor Dr. X is head of 
the department for 
heart surgery of a 
university hospital. 
He receives medi-
cal-technology 
products, resources 
and services from 
companies. The 
company pays for 
certain expenses, 
like the travel costs 
for trips to profes-
sional conferences 
and for company 
and Christmas 
parties, to which 
Dr. X invited his 
department. 21 
3. Compliance 
risks of inten-
tional torts at 
the expense of 
the university 
hospital or at 
the expense of 
third parties 
Tortious actions 
are consciously and 
knowingly com-
mitted, fully aware 
of the relevant 
circumstances 
Increasing com-
mercialization of 
medicine as well as 
a bottom-up con-
trol vacuum in an 
autocratic struc-
tured management 
22 
An intentional lack 
allocations in organ 
procurement 23 
Table 1. Compliance risks in university hospitals 
II. COMPLIANCE RISKS DON’T JUST AFFECT “THOSE OTHER GUYS” 
 
   In the pursuit of compliance in university hospitals, those responsible must be pre-
pared to acknowledge that the aforementioned risks exist or can exist in any hospital or 
clinic, not just in other health-care facilities. It is well known that risk awareness and the 
mission statement established by upper management—the tone and example these set, 
and the ensuing catalysts and multiplier-effect therefrom—are critical to, and one of the 
decisive factors to the successful implementation and consequential enforcement of 
			
21
 Case before BGH, judgment from 10/23/2002, Az: StR 541/01, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 765, 
763 (2003). 
22
 Compare to Hendrik Schneider, § 4 Rdnr. 26, in Wirtschaftsstrafrecht (Hauke Brettel & Hendrik Schneider, 
1st ed. 2014). 
23
 Compare to the so-called organ-donor scandal: Hendrik Schneider & Josephine Busch, Der Lebensretter als 
Mörder? Der „Organspendeskandal“ an den Grenzen der Strafrechtsdogmatik, NEUE KRIMINALPOLITIK 
362, 363 (2013). 
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compliance tools.24 Consequently, this demands an incentive to be presented to pro-
mote compliance, and that is typically a yearly function by the enterprise’s decision-
makers. 
 
In light of this, it’s worth highlighting that the impetus to establish a Compliance-
Management-System (CMS) in the Düsseldorf University Hospital and this system’s 
sustainability is in the hands of upper management. Therefore, the importance of this 
support is clear, especially considering the complex conditions involved in the operation 
of a university hospital. This is a direct result of the cooperation-model which underlies 
the partnership between the Düsseldorf University Hospital and the Heinrich-Heine 
University. As a result this analysis requires a consideration of the differing authorities 
and contextual rights of participation held by both university and faculty leadership. In 
order to achieve substantial and coordinated results, systematic cooperation is required 
from all involved parties, and in particular from parties on the managerial level (hospital 
management, the rectorate, the faculty council, and the dean). 
 
Empirical inquiries into the implementation of compliance mechanisms in varying in-
dustries as well as the failure to appreciate the importance of such compliance apparat-
uses demonstrate that risk consciousness has not spread into the hospital industry as it 
has in other sectors.25 Evidently discussions about compliance—which are already taking 
place in other industries—must gain acceptance in the health care industry, especially in 
those organizations which operate under the assumption that they have no compliance 
risks. These organizations face an especially high risk: an organization oblivious to the 
possibility of risk creation in-house. By developing all hospital employees’ risk con-
sciousness, relevant compliance risks can be put into focus, weaknesses in prevalent in-
ternal processes can be spotted, and opportunities for intentional torts can be utilized. 
 
After recognizing substantial compliance risks and how they arise at the Düsseldorf 
University Hospital, key elements addressing those high-priority risks were developed 
and implemented in the institution’s CMS. This process is, though, still ongoing. 
 
A. Analysis of the existing compliance-instruments and identification of key 
goals in improving the Compliance Management System 
 
At the offset, it should be noted that this process at the Düsseldorf University Hospital 
has already begun. Different levels of the university hospital have already been engrossed 
in discussions about compliance and risk-prevention, which encompass the enhance-
ment in the quality of medical care, and diverse provisions by means of guidelines and 			
24
 For a political and sociological perspective, see COLIN CROUCH & CAMILLA MACLEAN, THE RESPONSIBLE 
CORPORATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2011). 
25
 Hendrik Schneider, Kevin Grau & Kristin Kißling, „Der Schock von Berlin saß tief!“ Ergebnisse eines empir-
ischen Forschungsvorhabens zu Compliance im Gesundheitswesen und der Pharmaindustrie, CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 48, 48 (2013). 
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regulations have been advanced.26 Furthermore, the presented risks are being minimized 
through various measures, such as in-house data protection, protected health infor-
mation, managerial control over commercial and medical dimensions, sanitary measures 
and occupational safety. 
 
Goals were established for further implementation and improvements in the CMS, 
which were intended to prioritize compliance in the university hospital. These goals 
were based on an analysis of the existing compliance measures and special workshops. 
These workshops were attended by members of upper management, the authors of this 
article, members of human resources, and the administrators in the department of third-
party funding in attendance. 
 
Subsequent to this in-house evaluation of the Düsseldorf University Hospital’s CMS, 
corruption prevention became the core concern. This evaluation of the existing instru-
ments revealed that processes were already in motion on several different levels to avoid 
conflicts of interests and corruption through internal regulation and directives, touching 
upon the corresponding application forms and procedural standards (for example, “reg-
ulation of acquisitions/purchases”, “guidelines for dealings and cooperation with third-
party providers”, “the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf’s anti-corruption guide-
lines” as well as the applications for information and approval of additional business 
employment). With the aid of individual cases and proceedings—which were part of the 
analysis—deficits in different departments, in regulations, applications, and in valida-
tion measures were able to be identified. Against this background, it is necessary to har-
monize existing regulations, to eliminate redundancies, and to hone, trim and align the 
substance of regulations to the current legal situation. 
 
Within the scope of this in-house evaluation, it was essential that the involved depart-
ments openly criticized and disputed over the up-to-now implemented compliance 
measures. In regards to the extent, structure, transparency, and tolerability of compli-
ance instruments, those particular departments occasionally have distinct issues ranging 
from lacking guidelines to non-transparent, over-reaching regulation. Prospective regu-
lations must be carved out into configurations in conformity with the law and simulta-
neously with an eye to the intended audience. It was also necessary to promote the un-
derstanding that compliance requires thinking outside of the box, and to think beyond 
work environments which are of immediacy to considerations of compliance. 
III. GOAL IMPLEMENTATION: ENHANCEMENT OF CORRUPTION-
PREVENTION 
 			
26
 On this point, compare with Abpfiff für Korruption im Gesundheitswesen, ÄRZTEZEITUNG (July 23, 2012), 
http://www.aerztezeitung.de/praxis_wirtschaft/recht/article/818480/abpfiff-korruption-
gesundheitswesen.html. 
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A. Legal Framework 
 
As explained above, corruption prevention concerns above all the cooperation of medi-
cal personnel with the medical equipment and pharmaceutical industries, and this 
touches upon areas of sponsoring (especially business trips), additional business em-
ployment, and research involving third-parties. The composition and structure of in-
house regulations outlining the requirements and limits of allowable cooperation are 
compiled in Table 2 below. 
 
 
Legal Frameworks Relevant requirements for compliance 
with AKRL control systems 
Higher Education Act of NRW § Freedom to Research and Teaching, 
§ 4 
§ Competency in the rectorate, presi-
dent and the university senate, dean-
ship, and faculty department councils 
§ Jurisdiction demarcation between the 
university hospital and the university 
in accordance with §§ 31, 31a 
§ Authorization of third-party funded 
research, § 71 
§ Regulations regarding the administra-
tion of third-party funds, § 71 
 
Regulation of University Additional 
business employment of NRW 27 
§ Differentiation between generally 
approved, notifiable additional busi-
ness work, and additional business 
work requiring authorization 
§ Requirements and boundaries of 
allowable additional business work 
§ Standards for allowing staff to exercise 
the right to engage in additional busi-
ness work 
 
Anti-Corruption Law of NRW 28 § Obligations to disclose, inform, con-
sult, inform of an offense in accord-
ance with §§ 12 or if there are indica-			
27
 Verordnung über die Nebentätigkeit des wissenschaftlichen und künstlerischen Personals an den Hochschu-
len des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen (Hochschulnebentätigkeitsverordnung-HNtV) from 12/11/1981 effec-
tive 3/09/2010. 
28
 Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Korruptionsbekämpfung und zur Errichtung und Führung eines Vergaberegis-
ters in Nordrhein-Westfalen (Korruptionsbekämpfungsgesetz-KorruptionsBG) from 12/16/2004 as amend-
ed on 12/19/2013. 
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tions that there is a corruption offense 
present 
§ Commitment to implementation of 
corruption prevention measures in ac-
cordance with § 19 
§ Implementation of the four-eyes-
principle in the execution of certain 
contracts, § 20 
§ Rotation principle, § 21 
Enactment of the Federal State Depart-
ment concerning fund allocation corrup-
tion 
§ Requirements for management re-
sponsibility (Subparagraph 2.1) 
§ Implementation of control mecha-
nisms (Subparagraph 2.2) 
§ Obligation to execute measures which 
serve to sensitize co-workers (2.4) 
§ Ancillary regulations authorizing 
additional business (Subparagraph 
2.7.2) 
§ Regulations on sponsorship (Subpar-
agraph 4) 
State Regulation on Travel Costs for 
NRW29 
§ Limits on travel costs and overnight 
reimbursements 
Rules of Professional Conduct for NRW 
Doctors30 
§ Medical autonomy in accordance with 
§ 30 
§ Appropriations prohibition in ac-
cordance with § 31 
§ Appropriations in contractual collab-
orations in accordance with § 33 
Criminal and Civil Statutes § §§ 331, etc. 31 
§ § 266 (duty of asset maintenance of 
entrusted assets of employers and as 
appropriate a third-party provider) 
 
UKVO § Delimitation of competencies in ac-
cordance with cooperation agree-
ments 
§ Regulations concerning the personnel 
of university with jobs in the universi-
ty hospital 			
29
 Landesreisekostengesetz (Landesreisekostengesetz—LRKG) from 12/16/1998, as ammended on 12/03/2013. 
30
 Berufsordnung für die nordrheinischen Ärztinnen und Ärzte from 11/14/1998, as ammended on 11/10/2012. 
31
 Concerning attendants at the university hospital, who are affected by the anti-corruptions policy, it primarily 
deals with officials as defined by §§ 11, 311 pp. StGB. 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 2   2016 
MECHTHILD LAMBERS & HENDRIK SCHNEIDER  |   
COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT AT THE DÜSSELDORF UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL 
 
PAGE  38 
Codes of conduct and anti-corruption 
policy of the HHU 
§ Prohibition of acceptance of rewards 
and gifts 
§ Threat of labor law repercussions and 
other consequences 
§ Exemplary lists concerning material 
elements 
Table 2. Legal framework addressing anti-corruption guidelines 
The above-referenced legal principles illustrate the substantial restrictions placed on the 
discretionary power to develop the composition of in-house hospital regulations ad-
dressing corruption prevention. The practice of additional business work or engaging in 
third-party funded projects can be hardly be legally restricted sufficiently to where the 
staff member pursuant to either statute, an employment contract, or an ordinance has 
an expressed valid claim on the acquisition and execution of a corresponding activity. 
 
B. Objective 
 
Anticorruption policy aim to integrate clearly understandable internal rules for the in-
dividual levels of cooperation of physicians and nurses, and the university hospital with 
the medical device and pharmaceutical industries. They are supplemental to the general 
policies in place and are not specifically tailored to the specifics of the operation of a 
university hospital, in this case, the anticorruption policy of the Heinrich-Heine-
University. 
 
The focus on the requirements of the anticorruption policy is to ensure that the legal 
premises and, in particular, the limits of legal liability and culpability are accounted for, 
without always requiring an individual case-study. The developed schemes should detail 
the complex criteria of the case law to the admissibility of certain operations (external 
funding, sponsorship, etc.) to the practical level of the employees in readily understand-
able language and (without requiring employees to expend effort in researching legal 
principles) avoid legally actionable acts to be committed out of ignorance of the limits of 
the law and its subparts. Thus under a socio-legal perspective it involves both a practical 
reduction in the complexity,32 which will create a dependable basis of knowledge on 
which employees can have legal certainty of no wrongdoing. On the other hand the 
policy processes in the examination and approval of individual collaborations (compli-
ance-by-design) helps standardize and protect the administrative resources of the house 
("praise the routine"33) and decisions for or against granting authorization and to make 
these processes transparent. The parallel clarification of legal risks and of strategies for 
avoiding conflicts of interest and dependency-relationships complements those legal and 			
32
 Foundationally NIKLAS LUHMANN, VERTRAUEN: EIN MECHANISMUS DER REDUKTION SOZIALER KOM-
PLEXITÄT 100 (1st ed. 1986). 
33
 Niklas Luhmann, Lob der Routine, Band 55 VERWALTUNGSARCHIV 1, 23 (1964). 
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process-oriented perspectives to an ethical and value-based approach, which aims to 
ensure the compliance commitment34 of employees.35 
 
C. Key Points of the anticorruption policy 
 
1. The scope of application and construction of anticorruption policy 
 
In accordance with the target set out above, the scope of application of anticorruption 
policies must be extend to third-party funds. These funds are supplemental to the regu-
lar budget raised to funding of research projects. They serve to support teaching, train-
ing and improvement in the health care system; they complement those funding 
schemes in the private sector or company. Other types of grants by third-parties are to 
be considered: donations, gifts, invitations, relevant grants of drug- and medical prod-
ucts, the financing of attending continuing education events and congresses by the in-
dustry, etc.36 
 
The rules are complemented and widened by implementing regulations, which are al-
ready situated in the various existing administrative areas. These rules would be to create 
additional instruments and regulations for compliance. The content of the implement-
ed regulations are based on the organizational structure of the administration. It is 
therefore based upon the department. Implementing regulations should be created only 
if additional regulations appear as absolutely necessary—in order words, compliant 
behavior has to be practically applicable. The anticorruption policy as a guiding docu-
ment should include all the essential principle of information (for example, definitions), 
so that provisions are not redundant in the implementing regulations. This document’s 
hierarchy is divided between its labor and information processes, so that on the one 
hand the administrative assistant and the addressee on the other hand are ensured that 
can key information can be easily accessible without any important information requir-
ing a different employee to educate on the policy. In this way, policy would not be 
muddled by different administrative areas’ interpretation of, for example, the four basic 
principles of compliance. 
 
Therefore, there would ideally would be a program to educate (particularly new) em-
ployees on these policies, which would educate employees how to conduct themselves if 			
34
 Christoph E. Hauschka & Gina Greeve, Compliance in der Korruptionsprävention – was müssen, was sollen, 
was können die Unternehmen tun?, BETRIEBS-BERATER  165, 166 (2007); Martin Schulz & Hartmut Renz, 
CB-Standard: Zum Berufsbild des Compliance Officers – Entwicklung branchenübergreifender Mindestan-
forderungen, BETRIEBS-BERATER 2512, 2513 (2012). 
35
 For a perspective on the mechanisms and so-called neutralization-strategies, compare Hendrik Schneider, 
Kognitive Dissonanz als Präventionsstrategie. Überlegungen zu den Möglichkeiten der Neutralisierung
von Neutralisierungstechniken, in Kriminologie—Jugendkriminalrecht—Strafvollzug, Gedächtnissschrift für 
Michael Walter 195 (Frank Neubacher & Michael Kubik eds., 2014). 
36
 In particular, compare to the regulation materials, Hendrik Schneider in Korruptionsprävention im Gesund-
heitswesen 60 (Susanne Boemke & Hendrik Schneider, 1st ed. 2011). 
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taking part in a third-party projects, in which equipment is loaned. This education will 
ensure that employees know the rules for the acceptance and use of by third-party funds 
or equipment/medications/etc. It further ensures that such practices are not undertaken 
without the execution of a contract or without securing financing for follow-up costs. A 
contract-exemplar, which addresses the concerns of the university hospital, will address 
these concerns and are outlined in the implemented regulations. Considering the con-
text of the implemented regulations, in reality there are two essential core elements: (1) 
detailed information in thematic areas (compliance in general); and (2) communications 
about to compliance observed, process-procedures, jurisdiction, and coordination. 
 
Where necessary and possible one should reference the already implemented regulations 
and also forms contract-exemplars or to the contact person. In the current revised im-
plemented regulations provisions concerning business trips and additional business 
employment were revised and streamlined. Pamphlets on application forms will provide 
additional information and serve as an action guide, answering employees’ questions 
and facilitate processes. The implemented policies concerning external funds include, 
among other things, elaborates on the definition of third-parties, gives further instruc-
tion and guidelines on the management and use of third-materials and information 
about it. This further advises the administration on questions to be included, for exam-
ple, a note on incorporating a coordination center for clinical studies (KKS). 
 
Implemented policies on procurements (purchasing order of purchasing) represent the 
most comprehensive control, as these relate to every conceivable instance the university 
hospital may address, include the principles, workflows and regulations that govern. For 
purchasing acquisitions, the guidelines, e.g. economy and thrift, the separation-principle 
and the principle of central procurement are mandatory. In terms of product groups 
and other categories of goods, the corporate procurement officer or contact person 
should be informed of such acquisitions. In the process organization, the description to 
the applicable regulations should be outlined (for example, in award procedures, the 
procurement of investment goods, proper supplies and services), or determining 
maintenance services (information management area, medical technology and other 
technology). Essential rules for medical products (acceptance, purchasing, and mainte-
nance) can already be found in the anticorruption policy itself and in the implemented 
regulations on procurements so that guidelines for medical devices are contained in in-
house agreements. 
 
The individual administrative areas responsible for the regular updating and adjustment 
of their regulations are basically independent, and are to support legality in its participa-
tion. By assuming the changes in the implemented regulations to incorporate more in-
terested actors, it follows that this is also within the framework of working groups. It has 
been shown that the currently envisaged process of implementation of regulation of 
third-party involvement and donations required not only substantive and legal adjust-
ment, but also an analysis of process procedure and the redefinition of responsibilities 
among the actors in medical personnel, the external-division of the coordinating center 
for clinical studies, and a legal administrative body. The framework which guides chang-
es or amendments in the implemented regulations is always the anticorruption policy. 
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As a result of the anticorruption policy’s high reach because of their implemented regu-
lations a document hierarchy is created, which is illustrated in Table. 3. 
 
Anticorruption Policy 
Implemented regu-
lation 
Implemented regu-
lation 
Implemented regu-
lation 
Implemented regu-
lation 
Business 
trips/Additional 
business 
Third-party fund-
ing/donations 
Acquisitions Medical products 
Table 3. Structure of the anticorruption policy 
According to a clarifying preamble, further clarification is needed of the appellative 
function and the establishment of the personal and material scope which clarifies the 
policy to be designated as classic basic principles of anti-corruption. These are highlight-
ed in all industry codes. 
 
2. Basic principles of anticorruption; their ascertainment in the AKRL and their 
implemented regulations 
 
Three basic principles of an anticorruption policy can be delineated: (1) the transparency 
principle, requiring the disclosure of all grants obtained by the commercial director of 
the university hospital; (2) the documentation principle, which requires documentation 
of all dealings and agreements, in particular by unilateral grants (for example, sponsor-
ships); and (3) the authorization principle,37 which requires all bilateral agreements to be 
contractually authorized. The authorization with full knowledge of the relevant con-
tractual provisions involves authorization on part of the top members of management, 
which falls within the meaning of § 331 Abs. 3 StGB. However the scope and meaning as 
found in the dogmatic §§ 331 ff. StGB has not yet clarified the matter conclusively. The 
relevant decisions of the BGH have shown that the presence of authorization is evidence 
			
37
 The question of who is responsible for the granting of authorization within the meaning of § 331, paragraph 3 
of the Criminal Code is disputed and not yet clarified last authentic by a Supreme Court decision. The law 
speaks of "the competent authority". Thus, the assumption is derived in criminal literature. In all cases in 
which no authorities structure are present due to the organizational structure of the house, the respective 
heads of the legal department is responsible (Siegfried Jutzi, Genehmigung der Vorteilsannahme bei nicht in 
einem öffentlich-rechtlichen Amtsverhältnis stehenden Amtsträgern, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR STRAFRECHT 
105, 106 (1991). The opposite conception (Albus, the cooperation between industry and physicians at medical 
university school directions. Under the suspicion of beneficial adoption and corruption according to §§ 331, 
332 of the Criminal Code, 1st edition, pp 104) according to which jurisdiction in this important practical cases 
(about transfers to an account opened and monitored by the hospital externally-account) is to go for example 
at university hospitals in the respective federal standing, is a hardly viable and dogmatic unconvincing; in par-
ticular, compare Hendrik Schneider, Die Dienstherrengenehmigung des § 331 Abs. 3 StGB. Bedeutung und 
Reichweite am Beispiel der Kooperation zwischen Ärzten und der Arzneimittel- bzw. Medizinprodukteindus-
trie, in Festschrift für Hans-Heiner Kühne zum 70. Geburtstag 477 (Esser et al. eds., 2013). 
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against the presence of an illicit agreement.38 Apart from that, the transparency and 
authorization principle also stem from relevant public-regulations and collective agree-
ment provisions. 
 
In addition—without dispensing with the medical expertise which professors and doc-
tors provide—the separation principle must be considered. In addition to the relevant 
provisions in the anticorruption policy this principle is supported by organizations in 
the procurement processes and a separate procurement regulatory bill. The procure-
ment regulatory requires truthfulness on part of the employee. Incorruptibility, loyalty 
to one's own company, and fairness to suppliers guide the values in compliance culture. 
 
The procurement of equipment and durable goods requires proper services and 
maintenance services on behalf of the board of management; these are the sole responsi-
bility of the central procurement offices. In essence, it is the four-eyes-principle. Orders 
and performance requirements executed by unauthorized employees are considered not 
legally enforceable. Medical, qualitative, and economic aspects are harmonized through 
a continued constructive exchange of experiences of the central shopping as well as those 
employees involved in purchasing. In accordance with the complementary actions of the 
risk-management office in procurement decisions it is further provided that at least 
three offers must be solicited, in some cases five. The end results of this decision-making 
processes must be documented in writing on specified forms. The existence of conflicts 
of interest is determined on an ad hoc basis, for example, by request of the Human Re-
sources Department (e.g. with respect to additional business employment, consultation 
agreements with certain providers). 
 
The equivalence principle, which is developed the allowance and upper limits of pay, is 
embodied in other provisions of the anticorruption policy. This ensures an appropriate 
balance between the services of doctors and refunds/inducements on the part of indus-
try. Note that it is the concept of appropriateness legal status may be a so-called en-
hancement concept, which opens up a certain economic playroom by the investigating 
authorities. Against this background, there is not an appropriate remuneration, but a 
corridor of reasonable lower limits, which are marked out by the already adequate and 
the upper limit of equitable remuneration.39 			
38
 Paradigmatically, BGH, judgment from 2/25/2003, Az. V StR 363/02, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
STRAFRECHT -RR 173, 171 (2003); “With the penal regulations of § 331 of the Criminal Code - intensified by 
the anti-corruption law – it is also the cause of an appearance of possible ‘venality’, which is encountered by 
officials. The sensibility of the legal community, when considering the culpability of the counter measure of 
benefits by officials, is also present in cases of this kind, and have now been sharpened considerably. Thus, in 
such cases with future officials, the adoption of any advantages that can be brought in connection with their 
official exercise will be demanded with strict hedging of transparency in respect to openness and solicitations 
on permits in regards to the legality of the university”; in the academic literature, compare Daniel Geiger, An-
tikorruption im Gesundheitswesen, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ZEITSCHRIFT 5, 1 (2011); see also the com-
ments to the FS drug industry to service men's approval (May 2010). Available online at www.fsa-pharma.de 
39
 See Hendrik Schneider & Thorsten Ebermann, Das Strafrecht im Dienste gesundheitsökonomischer Steuer-
ungsinteressen, ONLINEZEITSCHRIFT FÜR HÖCHSTRICHTERLICHE RECHTSPRECHUNG ZUM STRAFRECHT 	
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3. Regulations on the individual levels of cooperation with the industry 
 
In the above sections, it was shown that the anticorruption policy regulates the details of 
the cooperation of the medical professional personnel of the Düsseldorf University 
Hospital with the pharmaceutical and medical devices industry. Regulations have clari-
fied the research with third-party funding the administrative sovereignty is to be vested 
in the financial department. Third-party contracts are to be translated into English or 
another foreign language when necessary. It is the written-form requirement. It also 
deals with the permissible purposes of the use of third-party funds, the corresponding 
personnel measures and the possible uses in case of surplus external funds that are al-
lowed to remain in accordance with the underlying contract at the university hospital. 
In the implemented regulations of third-party dealings, it is prohibited the adoption of 
any kind of remuneration contained in third-party funds. Corresponding research pro-
jects are exclusively to be unwound through the university hospital. For each third-
party-plan a separate accounting book are set up. It is also ensured that a project manag-
er can, at any time, conduct an online account-query. 
 
Principle schemes also exist to set regulations addressing the acceptance of donations 
and for dealing appropriately with grants of the medical devices industry, the acceptance 
of gifts and invitations (including the setting of an unobjectionable value limits). 
Through the relevant regulations, those additional public and legal regulations (includ-
ing collective bargaining arrangements) are enhanced and refined. 
 
Another focus is on arrangements for the participation of so-called external (that is una-
ligned from UKD) and internal (that is, aligned by the workers of UKD) congresses and 
continuing education events—that is, as far as these are funded by the industry, or at 
least supported by their sponsorship. In this respect, a distinction must be made be-
tween active and passive participation. The anticorruption policy contains upper limits 
for legally acceptable, adequate sponsorship and standards for transparent contract de-
sign (including such areas as travel expenses/entertainment expenses/overnight stays 
/remuneration), which aim for a good balance of performance and reward. This would 
include, for example, renting exhibition booths. 
 
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ESSENTIAL STEPS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE COMPLIANCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM IN UKD 
 
  The essential steps for the implementation of the CMS can be summarized in Illustra-
tion 1 below. 			
219, 221 (2013); Daniel Geiger, Das Angemessenheitspostulat bei der Vergütung ärztlicher Kooperationspartner 
durch die Industrie, ARZNEIMITTEL UND RECHT  99, 101 (2013). 
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Compliance-Aim 
 
 
 
 
Illustration 1. Steps in implementing the CMS 
V. COMPLIANCE ORGANIZATIONS  
 
  The Düsseldorf University Hospital has deliberately refrained from creating an inde-
pendent agency to exclusively engage in compliance functions. At the university hospi-
Impulse and Mission Statement of the 
University Hospital Management 
Survey 
Determining the 
legal parameters; 
discretionary and 
compositional 
scopes 
Simplify administrative 
processes 
Minimize risks for the 
corporation and its 
employees 
Affect long-term cor-
porate-culture 
Implementation 
How to organize it? How to establish it? How to regulate it? 
Through standardized 
procedures 
Through precise (le-
gal) rules of conduct 
Through definitions as 
well as communication 
of leading results for 
compliance-culture 
How to monitor it? 
Through revisions and 
sustainability protection 
Compliance System 
Risk Analysis 
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tal, compliance is in the form of three-lines-of-defense model (see illustration 2). This 
means that after the operational management of compliance in the medical, nursing and 
administrative areas, the staff functions stand as the second line of defense. In particular 
are the controlling, the administrative body right and quality control (medical-
organizational). The third line is the function of internal audit, which measures risk 
management and evaluates their results. 
 
Empirically, compliance violations are known by various representatives of the three 
lines. An exchange between second and third line defenses is implemented to evaluate 
incidents and to consider specifics and draw conclusions therefrom. Reporting lines 
exist for incorporating experiences, and to initiate response from the public relations 
officers. 
 
  
 
   
    
 
   
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
   
Illustration 2. The Three-lines-of-Defense at the Düsseldorf University Hospital 
(Graphic by Thomas Breitfeld, Head of Internal Audit, Mechthild Lambers and Prof. Dr. Hen-
drik Schneider) 
Three Lines of Defense 
Risk Consideration 
Position 
Task 
Before the event Before the event/ after the event After the event 
First line Second line Third line 
Risk taker Risk control (staff functions) 
Risk protection 
(internal revision) 
Risk prevention, 
awareness, and 
handling of risk 
takers (operative 
management) 
1. In advance, 
testing, audit-
ing, and con-
sulting; 
2. Composition; 
3. Sensitizing 
 
= Measures of 
Risk 
Assessment of the 
measures for risk 
control and the 
ensuing results 
Register and 
prevent 
Detect and re-
spond 
Evaluate and 
communicate Disclosure of risk: 
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VI. LOOKING FORWARD 
 
  In the future, the Düsseldorf University Hospital will essentially faces the following 
challenges and questions: 
 
It could be asked whether a centralization of compliance would result in higher levels of 
productivity as a byproduct of the second line of defense. Currently, a model is in place 
which already involves actors in compliance regulation through a office of compliance. 
A separate compliance organization could be created to address jurisdictional issues and 
questions concerning (policy-) skills. 
 
The creation of a compliance board has not yet been conclusively approved. A compli-
ance board shouldn’t only regulate particular cases on an ad hoc basis based on referrals 
from affected areas, but to serve as a middleman between the individual areas of the 
university hospital (shopping, finance, personnel, etc.) to allow a rule-based exchange 
about compliance issues. This exchange should aim at identifying the fundamental is-
sues in compliance in the organization and then developing solutions. Moreover, it 
would be designed so to have at least one board member who would have an obligation 
to report to the executive board. 
 
Overall, compliance should not lead into compliance overkill. Like the adage of the me-
dieval pharmacist: it is the dosage that makes the poison. 
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I. COMPLIANCE  
 
   The meaning of Corporate Governance is all values and principles guiding or regulat-
ing good and responsible business management.  
 
Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for managing compliance, risks and checks is 
the prerequisite for the latter.  
 
For that reason, a compliance management system was set up at the University Hospital 
Frankfurt in 2015.  
 
The management system “Recht im Betrieb” assists the Management Board, senior ex-
ecutives and officers in charge of various delegated statutory tasks facing the executives 
and officers in charge (Betriebsbeauftragte) to identify, monitor and verifiably delegate 
or fulfill their statutory obligations, as well as monitor, update and document them.1 
 
The purpose of a compliance management system consists in fulfilling the legal obliga-
tions. As at every other company, the members of the Hospital Management also need 
to conduct themselves in a legally compliant manner and ensure that all the employees 
likewise conduct themselves in a legally compliant manner.2 
 
For the University Hospital Frankfurt 5,570 legal obligations have been ascertained. The 
Management Board is not in a position to fulfill over 5,500 obligations of the hospital 
personally. It needs to be ensured by means of organizational steps that the company 
and its employees operate in accordance with the legal framework. This obligation to 
ensure legal compliance at the company by means of organizational steps is the respon-
sibility of the Commercial and Medical Directors. They are liable for any loss caused 
through their organizational fault.  
 
There are six tasks that need to be fulfilled in order to avoid organizational fault. How a 
company, and thus also the University Hospital, is to be organized can be seen from the 
new ISO 19600 standard.3 It has been applicable since 15/12/2014 as a set of new, interna-			
1
  ISO 19600 „Compliance-Management-System-Guidelines“ published 12/15/2014; Manfred Rack, CB-Test: 
Die rechtlichen Voraussetzungen für ein Compliance-Management-System, COMPLIANCE BERATER, 279 
(2014). 
2
  ANNEMARIE MATUSCHE-BECKMANN, DAS ORGANISATIONSVERSCHULDEN, 143 (2001); GERALD SPIND-
LER, UNTERNEHMENSORGANISATIONSPFLICHTEN, 760 (2002); TIM NEELMEIER, ORGANISATIONSVER-
SCHULDEN PATIENTENFERNER ENTSCHEIDER UND EINRICHTUNGSBEZOGENE AUFKLÄRUNG, 64 (2014); 
Jürgen Klauber et al., Schwerpunkt Patientensicherheit, in Krankenhaus-Report 2014 3 (Jürgen Klauber et al. 
eds., 2014). 
3
  ISO 19600 “Compliance-Management-System-Guidelines“ published 12/15/2014. 
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tional self-regulatory provisions for compliance management. Whoever complies with 
these rules on corporate governance will avoid being accused of organizational fault.  
 
a. All the obligations of a company are to be ascertained. Ignorance is no protec-
tion against punishment. For the University Hospital Frankfurt a total of 5,579 
pertinent obligations have been ascertained, based on 1,100 relevant regulations, 
which have in turn been sifted out by the database from an aggregate corpus of 
more than 15,000 regulations. As further, specific types of regulations and 
sources of legal obligations, the recommendations of the Robert Koch Insti-
tute, S3 guidelines, Guidelines of the Federal German Medical Association 
(Bundesärztekammer), Guidelines of the Joint Federal Committee (GBA) and 
Court judgments taken from medical legislation and hospital legislation have 
been analyzed, searching for legal obligations. The compliance of legal obliga-
tions serves the purpose of averting risk still prior to it being able to cause any 
damage.  
 
b. The second organizational obligation consists of delegating these obligations to 
the 6,000 employees of the University Hospital Frankfurt. No obligation may 
remain without anyone being responsible for it. The legal obligations are to be 
delegated to the departments of the hospital in which the risk to be averted is 
caused. All officers having a staff function, including the Quality and Compli-
ance Officers, need to co-operate in complying with any legal obligations, in 
particular the Management Board and senior executives have to provide advice, 
inform the employees of the hospital about their obligations, and monitor their 
compliance. They are subject to officers’ liability, and may be held responsible 
based on aiding and abetting. All things considered, after delegating all obliga-
tions ascertained the “Recht im Betrieb” management system offers one-click 
information on which hospital employees are required to fulfill which obliga-
tions in which department and in what period of time.  
 
c. All the legal obligations need to be updated. On average around 400 legal obli-
gations are amended every month, out of which, on average, only 40% are rele-
vant at a given company. The 400 amended, new or repealed legal obligations 
are automatically sifted out by the database of the “Recht im Betrieb” manage-
ment system. Sixty per cent of the usual effort is saved through the digitalized 
filter. 
 
d. All the legal obligations need to be fulfilled. In order to avoid directors’ and of-
ficers’ liability and liability of authorized representatives, as well as officers’ lia-
bility, all the employees of the hospital need to be interested in fulfilling their 
obligations - the Management Board, the executives who are line managers and 
the Quality and Compliance Officers having a staff function. 
 
e. The fulfillment of all obligations is to be monitored. The Management Board is 
obliged to carry out superintendence. This task cannot be delegated. It will re-
main exclusively the management’s responsibility. In the Compliance manage-
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ment system, the superintendence can be attended to using a single user inter-
face. The respective current process status can be retrieved. The digitalized 
Compliance management system allows for checking compliance at a glance. 
The officers responsible for the obligations that are overdue and have not been 
fulfilled can be notified about it from the user interface by e-mail, and have it 
brought to their attention.  
 
f. As a sixth point, all the organizational procedures are automatically document-
ed in the system. The reversal of the burden of proof applies. Should patients 
suffer loss or damage, the hospital - and not the patient affected - needs to pro-
vide evidence that the obligations were known and fulfilled. Should losses occur 
at the hospital, it must not be the result of poor organization. The University 
Hospital Frankfurt has, for the first time, deployed a digitalized Compliance 
management system that has been tried and tested at several hundred industrial 
companies over the past 20 years. The organizational obligations are the same. 
Only the applicable legal obligations are different, that avert typical risks at a 
clinic.  
II. CONCLUSION 
 
Through the digitalization of the Compliance Management System “Recht im Betrieb”, 
the effort required for compliance management has been considerably reduced. Patient 
safety is increased. The D&O liability, as well as the representatives’ liability of the other 
executives, and the officers’ liability is reduced. The potential for conflict between pa-
tient safety due to medical services provided to the highest standard and simultaneous 
compliance with the efficiency rule in accordance with the Social Security Code (SGB) 
and the regulations of the Joint Federal Committee (GBA) becomes transparent, and 
enables targeted solutions. Especially conflicts between the doctors carrying out the 
treatment and the Hospital Management, which is remote from the patient, are avoided 
through compliance with all the organizational obligations. Medical malpractice due to 
organizational defects can be avoided. Through efficient compliance management, the 
Management Board, senior executives and all the doctors carrying out the treatment, 
and ultimately the patients treated, whose protection from damage due to organization-
al malpractice is the issue, benefit.  
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ABSTRACT 
German companies or German-based subsidiaries of international businesses may become 
subject of, or otherwise involved in, investigations by German or foreign regulatory or law 
enforcement authorities.  In the context of such investigations, it is not unusual for the 
concerned company to face informal requests from German or foreign regulatory and law 
enforcement authorities for voluntary cooperation. Oftentimes, such requests focus on the 
transfer of electronic data for investigatory purposes, and such data typically relate, in 
whole or in part, to individuals (e.g. employees, suppliers and customers). 
 
In these and other cases, compliance of German companies or German-based subsidiaries 
with informal requests from regulatory and law enforcement authorities may itself entail 
a compliance risk or even constitute a breach by the corporate entity of the German data 
protection laws resulting in criminal prosecution, administrative sanctions, or damage 
claims and other actions by third party individuals.  This article outlines the scope of 
application of the German Federal Data Protection Act, introduces the applicable statu-
tory provisions, and discusses the relevant considerations in the context of an informal 
request by a regulatory or law enforcement authority for voluntary cooperation in the 
context of global investigations, in particular where a German-based entity faces requests 
from authorities abroad. 
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   Many German companies maintain business operations or perform business activities 
abroad and, equally, many international businesses maintain subsidiaries in Germany. 
In doing so, the German companies are required to comply with the laws applicable to 
them in the countries where they maintain operations or perform business activities, 
and the German-based subsidiaries of international businesses are required to comply 
with German law. Against this background, in suspected cases of non-compliance with 
applicable laws, it is not unusual for corporate entities based in Germany to become 
subject of, or otherwise involved in, investigations by German or foreign regulatory or 
law enforcement authorities. The Siemens case, the Daimler case, the LIBOR case or, 
most recently, the investigations in the automotive sector are prominent examples of 
global investigations involving German companies or German-based subsidiaries of 
international businesses. In the context of such investigations, it is not unusual for the 
concerned company to face informal requests from German or foreign regulatory and 
law enforcement authorities for voluntary cooperation. Oftentimes, such requests focus 
on the transfer of electronic data for investigatory purposes, and such data typically 
relate, in whole or in part, to individuals (e.g. employees, suppliers and customers).1 In 
the context of an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) or the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), for example, pursuant to a memorandum is-
sued by the Deputy Attorney General of the DOJ on September 9, 2015 on the individ-
ual accountability for corporate wrongdoing (“Yates Memorandum”), “to be eligible for 
any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts 
about the individuals involved in corporate misconduct.”2 Given the variety of potential 
adverse consequences of non-cooperation including fines, sanctions, loss of cooperation 
credit, and negative media coverage3, companies will typically be inclined to comply 
with any such informal request for voluntary cooperation including the required data 
transfers. 
 
While this position is understandable, German companies and subsidiaries of interna-
tional businesses located in Germany should thoroughly reflect on the legal implications 
of the actions required to comply with such a request.4 The reason for this is that, under 
German law, informal requests by German or foreign regulatory and law enforcement 
authorities do not per se form a legal basis for the required actions. Rather, the German-
based corporate entity has to asses, taking into account the legal rules and regulations 			
1  Tim Wybitul, How to Conduct E-mail Reviews in Germany, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 59, 62 
(2016). 
2  DOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Yates Memorandum, September 9, 2015 
(www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download), p. 3. 
3  For an account of a case of operational and reputational damage as a consequence of the lack of cooperation, 
see Folker Bittmann, Internal Investigations under German Law, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 74, 84 
(2015).     
4  On the conflicting priorities in such situations, see Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in 
Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel Criminal Proceedings,  COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 
52 et seq. (2016). 
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applicable to it, whether or not it is actually permitted to meet an informal request of a 
German or foreign regulatory and law enforcement authority. In certain cases, compli-
ance of the corporate entity with such an informal request may itself entail a compliance 
risk or even constitute a breach by the corporate entity of the laws applicable to it result-
ing in criminal prosecution, administrative sanctions, or damage claims and other ac-
tions by third party individuals.5 In this context and in relation to requested transfers of 
personal data, the data protection laws applicable in Germany, particularly the German 
Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz – “FDPA”), are especially im-
portant to be taken into consideration.6  
 
This article outlines the scope of application of the FDPA (I.), introduces the applicable 
statutory provisions, and discusses the relevant considerations in connection with an 
informal request by a regulatory or law enforcement authority for voluntary coopera-
tion in the context of global investigations (II. and III.), in particular where a German 
based entity faces requests from authorities abroad (III.).  While this article focuses on 
the current legal framework in Germany governed by the FDPA and the European Data 
Protection Directive of 1995 (“DPD”), it also takes into account the General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (“GDPR”)7 as published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union on May 4, 2016 by way of reference where appropriate. As from May 2018, the 
legal framework for the protection of personal data in the European Union will be pri-
marily governed by the provisions of the GDPR. 
 
I. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL DATA PRO-
TECTION ACT 
 
   At present, the FDPA constitutes the central legal framework in the area of data pro-			
5  See Sascha Süße & Carolin Püschel, Collecting Evidence in Internal Investigations in the Light of Parallel 
Criminal Proceedings,  COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 26, 36 (2016): “The collecting of evidence itself 
must certainly be compliant with all applicable laws, i.e. must not violate any criminal, data protection or labor 
laws.” 
6  See Christian Pelz, Ambiguities in International Internal Investigations, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 
14, 16 (2016): “Privacy and data protection issues are of major concern in any kind of compliance review, com-
pliance audit and in particular in international internal investigations.”   
 Under certain circumstances, stricter legal standards may apply in addition to, or in lieu of, the FDPA, such as 
the German Telemedia Act and the German Telecommunications Act, or in the case of the personal data of 
the customers of credit institutions, the principles of banking secrecy.  These standards will not be addressed 
in this article.  As to the standards applicable under German law to email reviews, see Tim Wybitul, How to 
Conduct E-mail Reviews in Germany, COMPLIANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAL, 59 et seq. (2016); Tim Wybitul & 
Wolf-Tassilo Böhm, E-Mail-Kontrollen für Compliance-Zwecke und bei internen Ermittlungen, CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE-ZEITSCHRIFT, 133, 133 (2015). 
7  See Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protec-
tion of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), O.J. 2016, L 119/1 (hereinafter 
“GDPR”). 
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tection in Germany. The FDPA implements the DPD which aims to harmonize the 
data protection regimes in all EU Member States.8 The purpose of the DPD is “to protect 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to 
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data”.9 Correspondingly, it is the pur-
pose of the FDPA “to protect the individual against his/her right to privacy being im-
paired through the handling of his/her personal data”.10     
 
A. The Concept of “Personal Data” 
 
The concept of “personal data”, under German and European law, is broad11 and en-
compasses any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, the 
so-called data subject.12 Pursuant to the Article 29 Working Party, a committee of repre-
sentatives of the national data protection authorities of the EU Member States, “a per-
son can be considered as “identified” when, within a group of persons, he or she is "distin-
guished" from all other members of the group.” 13 In contrast, an “identifiable” person is 
“a person who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, men-
tal, economic, cultural or social identity”.14 Personal data within this meaning can be 
included, for instance, in notebook entries, personal files, minutes, documentation relat-
ing to goods, services and financial transactions, information about customers, suppliers 
and business partners. Such data is often significant for regulatory or criminal investiga-
tions as it can provide evidence for the behavior of one or more individuals, corporate 
bodies such as boards or committees or even the business practice throughout a compa-
ny or an entire corporate group. 			
8  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, O. J. 1995, L 
281/31 (“Data Protection Directive” or “DPD”).  For information on the DPD, see Paul M. Schwartz &Daniel 
J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union, CALIFORNIA LAW 
JOURNAL, 877, 882-884 (2014); Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and 
Procedures, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1966, 1971-1979 (2013); Paul M. Schwartz, Information Privacy in the 
Cloud, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 1624, 1639-1642 (2013); Virginia Boyd, Financial Priva-
cy in the United States and the European Union: A Path to Transatlantic Supervisory Harmonization, 
BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 939, 958-967 (2006). 
9   Article 1(1) DPD.  
10  Section 1(1) FDPA. 
11  See Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, June 20, 2007, p. 4 
(“The Directive contains a broad notion of personal data”).  As to the common features and differences of the 
concepts used in the U.S. and Europe, see Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Reconciling Personal Infor-
mation in the United States and European Union, CALIFORNIA LAW JOURNAL, 877, 881 et seq. (2014); Paul 
M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, HARVARD LAW RE-
VIEW, 1966, 1968-1992 (2013); more profoundly, James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: 
Dignity versus Liberty, YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1151, 1153 et seq. (2004). 
12  Section 3(1) FDPA, Article 2a) DPD.  
13  Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, June 20, 2007, p. 12.  
14  Article 2a) DPD.  For a more detailed analysis, see Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept 
of personal data, WP 136, June 20, 2007, p. 12 et seq.  
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B. “Collection, Processing and Use” of Personal Data 
 
The FDPA governs the “collection, processing and use of personal data” in Germany.15  
“Collection”, per its definition, is the obtaining of data regarding the data subject.16  
“Processing”, on the other hand, includes various activities within the scope of activity of 
a company subject to an information request by an authority. Thus, “processing” cap-
tures, inter alia, the transfer of such personal data.17 “Transfer”, in turn, means the dis-
closure to a third party of personal data stored or obtained by means of data processing 
through transmission of the data to the third party or, in the terms of the DPD, the 
“disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available” of personal 
data.18 
  
In view of the above, the provision by companies of information relating to individuals 
such as employees, suppliers and customers to public authorities may be relevant under 
the FDPA in two respects: First, the provision by the company may qualify as transfer 
and, thus, processing of personal data within the meaning of the FDPA. Second, the 
receipt of the information by the public authority may qualify as collection of personal 
data within the meaning of the FDPA. 
II. DATA TRANSFERS TO GERMAN REGULATORY OR LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AUTHORITIES 
 
   In regard to the collection of personal data by a public authority from a private sector 
entity, the FDPA establishes a clear distinction:  In such cases, the public authority shall 
either inform the private sector entity of the legal provision requiring the disclosure, i.e. 
the transfer, of the relevant personal data or, alternatively, of the fact that such disclo-
sure is voluntary.19 In the former case, and assuming the requirements of the relevant 
provision are met, the private sector entity is legally obliged to transfer the relevant per-
sonal data to the public authority. In the latter case, i.e. in the absence of a statutory 
obligation to transfer the relevant personal data, the private sector entity, before transfer-
ring the relevant personal data, has to ensure that it is actually allowed to do so.20  			
15   Section 1(2) FDPA, Article 3(1) DPD. Also see Article 4(2) GDPR. 
16  Section 3(3) FDPA. Examples in legal literature for the “collection” of personal data include the request of 
personal records or the active receiving of media or documentation including personal information, see Ulrich 
Dammann, in BDSG, Section 3 m.n. 109, (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); see also Benedikt Buchner, in BDSG, 
Section 3 m.n. 26 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
17  Section 3(4) Sent. 1 FDPA.  See Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on surveillance of electronic 
communications for intelligence and national security purposes, December 5, 2014, p. 37-38. 
18  Section 3(4) Sent. 2 No. 3a) FDPA and Article 2b) DPD.  Also see Article 4(2) GDPR. 
19  Section 13(1a) FDPA. 
20  Bettina Sokol & Philip Scholz, in BDSG, Section 13 m.n. 30 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Peter Wedde, in 
BDSG, Section 13 m.n. 21 (Wolfgang Däubler, Thomas Klebe, Peter Wedde & Thilo Weichert, 5th ed. 2016); 	
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Pursuant to the general rule set forth in Section 4(1) FDPA, the transfer of personal data 
by a private entity to a third party, including a requesting regulatory or law enforcement 
authority, requires either the consent of the data subject or a statutory authorization. 
 
A. Consent 
 
As regards the consent of the data subject, such consent shall be effective only when 
based on the “data subject’s free decision” (Section 4a(1) FDPA).21  Further, “data subjects 
shall be informed of the purpose of collection, processing or use and, in so far as the cir-
cumstances of the individual case dictate or upon request, of the consequences of withhold-
ing consent.  Consent shall be given in writing unless special circumstances warrant any 
other form”.22  Additionally, due to its voluntary nature, consent can be withdrawn at 
any time, removing the legal basis for the processing.23 In an investigation context, for a 
company facing an information request by a public authority, it is oftentimes not a 
viable option to obtain the consent of the relevant data subjects.  In some cases, where 
the relevant information relates to a vast number of individuals, this would require an 
excessive administrative effort; in other cases, the request for consent would make the 
relevant individual aware of the investigation and, thus, potentially defeat its objective 
and purpose.  Also, with regard to employees’ personal data (see II.B. below), there is a 
controversy as to whether and to what extent an employee’s consent vis-à-vis the em-
ployer can be regarded as a free decision within the meaning of Section 4a(1) FDPA due 
to the imbalance of power inherent in the employment relationship, and, consequently, 
calls the processing of the data by the employer into question.24  Finally, the concerned 
individuals may decide not to grant their consent or, after having initially granted the 
consent, to withdraw it at a later stage. 
 
B. Statutory Authorizations – Legitimate Purpose, Necessity and Balancing of 
Interests 			
Jutta Stender-Vorwachs, in BeckOK BDSG, Section 13 m.n. 16 (Heinrich Amadeus Wolff & Stefan Brink et al 
15th ed. 2015). 
21  The concept of consent remains a legal basis for processing also under the GDPR (see Article 6(1) a) GDPR).  
The requirements for a consent to be valid under the GDPR are stipulated in Article 7 GDPR. 
22  Section 4a(1) FDPA. 
23  After the withdrawal of the consent by the data subject, the consent no longer constitutes a legal basis for the 
use of the relevant personal data. Correspondingly, the relevant personal data may no longer be used, unless a 
statutory authorization is available.  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4a  m.n. 94, 96, 103 (Spiros Simitis, 8th 
ed. 2014); Kai-Uwe Plath, in BDSG, Section 4a m.n. 70 et seq. (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in 
BDSG, Section 4a m.n. 81 et seq. (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd  ed. 2013). 
24  The Article 29 Working Party has voiced its skepticism in this context, see Opinion 8/2001 on the processing 
of personal data in the employment context, 5062/01/EN/Final, WP 48, September 13, 2001, p. 23;  Working 
document on a common interpretation of Article 26(1) of Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, 
2093/05/EN, WP 114, p. 11.  The German Federal Labor Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht), though, has stated that 
even in an employment context there is no reason in principle why an employee’s consent should not be con-
sidered a free decision, judgment of December 11, 2014 (8 AZR 1010/13). 
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As regards the statutory authorization to process personal data, the FDPA contains a 
number of provisions which explicitly allow for the processing, including transfer and 
collection, of personal data, subject to the requirements and limitations described there-
in.  The common feature of these provisions is that each one of them sets forth a specific 
purpose for which, and only for which, the data controller is authorized to process the 
relevant personal data. While most of the statutory purposes are not relevant in an in-
vestigation context, the statutory authorizations relating to data processing for criminal 
prosecution purposes, for averting threats to state or public security, and for the protection 
of the legitimate interests of the company or a third party may generally be applicable.  
 
1. Criminal Prosecution Purposes 
 
The FDPA allows for processing of personal data for criminal prosecution purposes.25 
In this context, however, slightly different legal regimes are applicable to personal data 
relating to employees and personal data relating to other individuals. 
 
Employee data.  While, pursuant to Section 32(1) FDPA, personal data of an employee 
may be collected, processed or used to detect criminal offences, employees benefit from 
a higher level of data protection than other individuals.  In the case of employees, docu-
mented factual indications are required that the data subject has committed a criminal 
offence in connection with his employment.26 As a consequence, first, the suspicion of a 
criminal offense is required as opposed to an offense of an administrative nature.27 Se-
cond, mere assumptions or speculations as to a potential criminal offense potentially 
committed by a given employee are not sufficient, as strong as they may be;  actual fac-
tual indications are required.28 Third, indications of a criminal offense potentially com-
mitted by a given employee unrelated to his employment are not in scope.29 Fourth, the 
relevant indications, including the damage occurred, the potential suspects, and the 
indications which are at the heart of the suspicion, are to be duly documented in written 			
25  Section 32(1) and 28(2) No. 2b) FDPA. 
26  Section 32(1) Sent. 2 FDPA. 
27  Achim Seifert, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 102 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); René Erfurth, Der „neue” Arbeit-
nehmerdatenschutz im BDSG, NEUE JURISTISCHE ONLINE-ZEITSCHRIFT, 2914, 2921 (2009); Tim Wybitul, 
Das neue Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: Verschärfte Regeln für Compliance und interne Ermittlungen, BETRIEBS-
BERATER 1582, 1584 (2009). 
28  Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 50 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Achim Seifert, in 
BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 103 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Uwe H. Schneider, Investigative Maßnahmen und 
Informationsweitergabe im konzernfreien Unternehmen und im Konzern, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELL-
SCHAFTSRECHT, 1201, 1206 (2010); Christiane Bierekoven, Korruptionsbekämpfung vs. Datenschutz nach der 
BDSG-Novelle, COMPUTER UND RECHT, 203, 206 (2010); René Erfurth, Der „neue” Arbeitnehmerdaten-
schutz im BDSG, NEUE JURISTISCHE ONLINE-ZEITSCHRIFT, 2914, 2920 (2009); Tim Wybitul, Das neue 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz: Verschärfte Regeln für Compliance und interne Ermittlungen, BETRIEBS-BERATER, 
1582, 1584 (2009). 
29  Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 51 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Achim Seifert, in 
BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 102 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
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form or electronically.30 Finally, the rights of participation of works councils must be 
observed.31  This relates to certain participation and consultation rights granted to works 
councils by applicable labor laws.32 
 
Data relating to other individuals.  To the extent applicable in an employment context33, 
as well as more generally in a commercial context, the data transfer to regulatory or law 
enforcement authorities must otherwise meet the requirements stipulated in Section 28 
FDPA.34 This provision sets forth various specific statutory authorizations which allow 
for the processing and transfer of personal data under certain conditions including to 
prosecute criminal offences.35 As is the case in the employment context, only the prosecu-
tion of criminal offenses, as opposed to administrative offenses, is in scope.36 Other than 
that, the requirements under Section 28 FDPA are less stringent than in an employment 
context, and, for example, the documentation of the suspicion or the involvement of a 
works council, if any, are not mandatory (see above). 
 
2. Averting Threats to State or Public Security 
 
The FDPA further also allows for the processing of personal data in order to avert 
threats to state or public security.37 The powers granted under this provision are relatively 
broad.  This notwithstanding, it does not generally allow for the processing of personal 
data for public interest purposes; in using the term “threats to state or public security”, 
the legislator has deliberately opted for a narrower term as opposed to a general public 
interest exemption.38 Also, the provision requires a concrete risk of such a threat, a mere 
			
30  Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 52 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
31  Section 32(3) FDPA. 
32  See, for example, Section 75(2), 80, and 87(1) No. 6 of the Works Council Constitution Act (Betriebsverfas-
sungsgesetz); for additional detail, see Tim Wybitul, How to Conduct E-mail Reviews in Germany, COMPLI-
ANCE ELLIANCE JOURNAl, 59, 72 (2016).  
33  There is some dispute in legal literature as to whether or to what extent Section 28 FDPA is applicable along-
side Section 32 FDPA in an employment context, see Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 7 (Jürgen Taeger 
& Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Achim Seifert, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 17 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Uwe 
H. Schneider, Investigative Maßnahmen und Informationsweitergabe im konzernfreien Unternehmen und im 
Konzern, NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT, 1201, 1205 (2010); Christiane Bierekoven, Korrup-
tionsbekämpfung vs. Datenschutz nach der BDSG-Novelle, COMPUTER UND RECHT, 203, 206 (2010); René 
Erfurth, Der „neue” Arbeitnehmerdatenschutz im BDSG, NEUE JURISTISCHE ONLINE-ZEITSCHRIFT, 2914, 
2922 (2009). 
34  See Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 31 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); similar Spiros 
Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 22 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
35  Section 28(2) No. 2 b) FDPA. 
36  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 190 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Kai-Uwe Plath, in BDSG, Section 
28 m.n. 97 (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 146 (Jürgen Taeger & 
Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
37  Section 28(2) No. 2b) FDPA. 
38  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 190 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
		 COMPLIANCE  ELLIANCE  JOURNAL   |   VOLUME 2   NUMBER 2   2016 
THOMAS KOPP & VALENTIN PFISTERER  |  BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 
PAGE  62 
abstract risk is not sufficient.39 Finally, specific statutory authorizations set forth in the 
laws applicable to the relevant regulatory or enforcement authorities take precedence 
over this particular exemption to the effect that such authorities have to rely on such 
specific authorizations, if any, to request the relevant data from private companies and 
may not rely on Section 28(2) No. 2b) FDPA where such statutory authorization does 
not exist or its requirements are not met.40 
 
3. Protection of the Legitimate Interests of the Company or a Third Party 
 
Finally, the FDPA allows for the processing of personal data to protect the legitimate 
interests of the company or a third party.41 Both authorizations are to be interpreted 
narrowly.42 
 
Legitimate interests of the company. Legitimate interests of the company within this 
meaning may be both monetary as well as non-monetary interests.43 The keen interest of 
a requesting third party, including regulatory or law enforcement authorities, does not 
qualify as a legitimate interest of the company.44 A cooperative relationship of the com-
pany with the relevant regulatory or law enforcement authority in general and the com-
pliance with an informal request of such an authority, including to avoid potential ad-
verse consequences of non-cooperation, should typically count among the legitimate 
interests of a company, the warranted narrow interpretation notwithstanding. 
 
Legitimate interests of a third party. There is no reason in principle why regulatory or 
law enforcement authorities should be excluded from the term “third party”. Therefore, 
the company facing an informal information request has to assess whether or not such 
information request is based on reasonable needs for information on the part of the 
requesting authority and whether or not such informational needs qualify as legitimate 
interests within this meaning. 
 
4. Additional Requirements: Necessity and Balancing of Interests 
 
Necessity. In each of the cases described above, the processing of the personal data must 
be “necessary” to pursue the legitimate purpose, i.e. to investigate the alleged criminal 
offence, to avert the threats to state or public security, or to protect the legitimate inter-			
39  Kai-Uwe Plath, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 97 (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 
28 m.n.144 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
40  Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n.146 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 192 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
41  Section 28(2) No. 1 and No. 2a) FDPA. 
42  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 98 and 174 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
43  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 104 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 
m.n.55 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
44  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 107 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
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ests of the company or a third party.45 The term “necessary” is generally interpreted nar-
rowly and strictly.46 As a consequence, it has to be examined carefully whether the en-
visaged data transfer could be replaced by a less intrusive action or the corresponding 
goal otherwise pursued by less intrusive means.47 
 
Balancing of interests. Further, in each of the cases described above, the data subject’s 
“legitimate interest” in keeping his personal data undisclosed are to be adequately taken 
into account.48 More precisely, in the case of data processing for the purpose of criminal 
prosecution, averting threats to state or public security and the protection of legitimate 
interests of a third party, there must not be any “reason to believe that the data subject 
has such legitimate interest” at all.49 In other words, a data transfer may not be based on 
the corresponding statutory authorizations if there is at least one single reason for the 
concerned individual providing for a legitimate interest of such individual to maintain 
his personal data undisclosed. Slightly less strict, in the case of data processing for the 
purpose of the protection of legitimate interests of the company, the data subject must 
not have an “overriding legitimate interest” in maintaining the confidentiality of his 
data.50 This requires a comprehensive proportionality assessment to evaluate the suita-
bility of the data processing for the purpose pursued, its necessity relative to potentially 
less intrusive means (see above), as well as its adequacy, especially in regards to the type 
and extent of data processing.51 In the course of this assessment, a comprehensive balanc-
ing of interests is required whereby the interests in favor of the data transfer (the self-
interests of the company) are to be weighed against the interest of the data subject in 
keeping his data confidential. As a result of such assessment, the interests of the data 			
45  Section 28(2) No. 1 and No. 2a) and b) FDPA. See Article 6(1) d), e) and f) GDPR. 
46  Achim Seifert, in BDSG, Section 32  m.n. 11 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Katrin Stamer & Michael Kuhnke, 
in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 16 (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 16 (Jürgen 
Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 182 et seq. (Spiros Simitis, 8th 
ed. 2014); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 135 et seq. (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
47  Achim Seifert, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 105 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Tim Wybitul, Das neue Bundesda-
tenschutzgesetz: Verschärfte Regeln für Compliance und interne Ermittlungen, BETRIEBS-BERATER, 1582, 1583 
(2009).  
48  Section 32(1) Sent. 2 and Section 28(2) No. 1 and No. 2 FDPA. 
49  Section 28(2) No. 1 and 2 FDPA.  A similar requirement is explicitly mentioned only in Article 6(1) f) GDPR 
(data processing necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by a controller or a third party).  
However, Article 6(3) GDPR states that the legal basis of the data processing referred to in Article 6(1) c) and 
e) GDPR (processing necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject or 
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority 
vested in the controller) must be rooted in European Union law or the law of the Member State to which the 
controller is subject.  The law of the Member State must meet a public interest objective or must be necessary 
to protect the rights and freedoms of others, respect the essence of the right to the protection of personal data 
and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  In the context of the corresponding assessment, the legit-
imate interests of the data subject should obviously be taken into consideration.  
50  Section 28(1) Sent. 1 No. 2 FDPA. 
51  Oliver Zöll, in BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 53 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Achim Seifert, in 
BDSG, Section 32 m.n. 106 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Jan Pohle, Unterlagen-, Daten- und E-
Mailauswertung unter Berücksichtung datenschutzrechtlicher Aspekte, in: Deutsch-Amerikanische Korrupti-
onsverfahren 309, 316 (Jürgen Wessing & Matthias Dann eds., 2013). 
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subject take precedence particularly in situations where the type and extent of the data 
processing are disproportionate to the purpose pursued.52 Also, in the context of regula-
tory or criminal investigations, it is of particular relevance whether the concerned indi-
vidual is a suspect, a potential witness or a person not involved in the investigated mis-
conduct. While the FDPA also generally protects the personal data of criminal sus-
pects53, in connection with the proportionality assessment, the interest of not getting 
involved in, or subject of, a regulatory or criminal investigation may weigh stronger in 
the case of potential witnesses or persons unrelated to the investigated misconduct than 
in the case of suspects. 
III. DATA TRANSFERS TO FOREIGN REGULATORY OR LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AUTHORITIES 
 
  The FDPA applies where the controller is either located or collects or processes person-
al data in Germany.54 A German-based corporate entity subject to an informal infor-
mation request by a foreign regulatory or law enforcement authority has to assess, in 
addition to the legality of the preparatory data collection, the permissibility of the envis-
aged data transfer in light of Sections 4b and 4c FDPA.55 These provisions establish 
specific requirements for the transfer of personal data across borders which apply in 
addition to the requirements applicable in a domestic context (see II. above).56 They 
further differentiate between data transfers to recipients located in EU or EEA Member 
States (see A. below) and data transfers to recipients located in what is known as Third 
Countries (see B. below). 
 
A. Regulatory or Law Enforcement Authorities located in EU or EEA Member 
States 
 
Data transfers to recipients located in EU or EEA Member States are primarily governed 
by Section 4b(1) FDPA which reads: “The transfer of personal data to bodies 1. in other 
Member States of the European Union, 2. in other states parties to the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area or 3. institutions and bodies of the European Communities 
shall be subject to (…) Sections 28 to 30a in accordance with the laws and agreements ap-			
52  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 180 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Kai-Uwe Plath, in BDSG, Section 
28 m.n. 53 and 95 et seq. (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 61 et seq. (Jür-
gen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013).  
53   See Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 28  m.n. 190 et. seq and 195 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Kai-Uwe Plath, 
in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 97 (Kai-Uwe Plath, 1st ed. 2013); Jürgen Taeger, in BDSG, Section 28 m.n. 141 and 
145 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). Also see Article 10 GDPR. 
54  Section 1(5) FDPA. 
55  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 9 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013) Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 38-39 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Philipp Räther & Nicolai Seitz, Übermittlung per-
sonenbezogener Daten in Drittstaaten Angemessenheitsklausel, Safe Harbor und die Einwilligung, MULTI-
MEDIA UND RECHT, 425, 426 (2002). 
56  Section 28 et seq. FDPA. 
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plicable to such transfer, in so far as transfer is effected in connection with activities which 
fall in part or in their entirety within the scope of the law of the European Communi-
ties.” Hence, the transfer of personal data to recipients in EU or EEA Member States is 
generally subject to the requirements applicable in a domestic context as discussed 
above, although in accordance with the laws and agreements applicable to such transfer, 
inasmuch as the transfer is effected in connection with activities which fall either entirely 
or in part within the scope of the law of the European Communities.57  
 
1. Prerequisite Requirements: Precedence Rule and Limited Scope of Applica-
bility 
 
This requirement raises at least two potential pitfalls to companies willing to comply 
with an informal request from an EU or EEA authority. 
   
Precedence rule. First, the provision states that the cross-border transfer of personal data 
has to occur “in accordance with the laws and agreements applicable to such transfer”.58  
This requirement implies that the envisaged data transfer, including its limits and condi-
tions, is subject to special laws or bilateral or multilateral agreements, if any such law or 
agreement applies in the specific case.59 Such laws or agreements may take precedence 
over the general data protection provisions contained in the FDPA and set forth the 
legal requirements applicable to the envisaged transfer.60 As a consequence, special at-
tention should be paid to whether or not a specific legal regime for cross-border data 
transfer exists in a given case and, if so, whether the specific requirements set forth in 
such regime are met. 
 
Limited scope of applicability. Second, the provision generally only authorizes cross-
border data transfers to the extent “activities which fall in part or in their entirety within 
the scope of the law of the European Communities” are affected. This refers to what was 
formerly known as the first pillar of the European Union pursuant to the Maastricht 
Treaty and, broadly speaking, comprised the area of economic and trade cooperation.61 
The first pillar should be distinguished from what was formerly known as the second 
pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and the third pillar (Police and Judicial 
Cooperation in Criminal Matters).62 The wording of Section 4b FDPA should be seen 			
57  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 10-13 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 25-37 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
58  Section 4b(1) FDPA. 
59  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 37 and 40 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
60  LUTZ BERGMANN, ROLAND MÖHRLE & ARMIN HERB, BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 24 (loose-leaf booklet ed. 
2014); Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 40 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Sec-
tion 4b m.n. 12 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
61  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 11 and 14 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, 
in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 33 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
62  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 11 and 14 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel 2nd ed. 2013). 
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in light of Art. 3(2) DPD. Pursuant to this provision, the DPD shall not apply to the 
processing of personal data “in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of 
Community law (…) and in any case to processing operations concerning public security, 
defense, State security (…) and the activities of the State in areas of criminal law”.63 Ra-
ther, the protection of personal data in connection with data transfers between EU 
Member States in the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters is, since 
recently, governed by a particular directive.64 As to the qualification of a given activity as 
falling inside or outside the scope of Community law, neither the wording nor case law 
of German courts give clear guidance as to which activity should be taken into account 
in this context – the business activities of the company (which should usually fall within 
the scope of the first pillar) or the investigative activities of the regulatory or law en-
forcement authorities to which the company is supposed to contribute by transferring 
the data (which may fall into the scope of the third pillar). In the so-called PNR decision 
of 2006, however, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) implicitly decided in favor of 
the latter.65 In the corresponding case, the ECJ had been asked by the European Parlia-
ment to annul the so-called PNR Agreement concluded between the EU and the U.S. in 
2004.66 The 2004 PNR Agreement allowed for the competent U.S. authority to access 
the PNR data stored in the reservation/departure control systems of air carriers located 
within the territory of EU Member States for the purpose of “preventing and combating 
terrorism and related crimes and other serious crimes that are transnational in nature, 
including organised crime”. In the decision handed down by the ECJ, the ECJ held that 
the 2004 PNR Agreement was invalid due to the lack of a suitable legal basis in Com-
munity law. The ECJ explained that “the transfer of PNR data to CBP constitutes pro-
cessing operations concerning public security and the activities of the State in areas of 
criminal law”67 and, therefore, could not be based on the DPD or otherwise on Com-
			
63  The scope of application of the GDPR is similarly restricted to the processing of personal data “in the course 
of an activity which falls within the scope of Union law” (which is, admittedly, more extensive than the law of 
the (former) European Communities) (see Article 2(2) a) GDPR).  However, the GDPR also excludes from its 
scope of application data processing “by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, de-
tection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties” (Article 2(2) d) GDPR) which 
mirrors what is set forth in Article 3(2) DPD. 
64  Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 04/27/2016 on the protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investiga-
tion, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free move-
ment of such data, and repeating Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, O.J. 2016, L 119/89. 
65  See ECJ, judgment May 30, 2006 (PNR) – C-317/04 – m.n. 56.  The acronym PNR stands for Passenger 
Name Record data (specific files on every passenger and journey created by air carriers) and relates to the 
transatlantic transfer of information contained in these files for law enforcement purposes.  For additional de-
tail, see Valentin M. Pfisterer, PNR in 2011: Recalling Ten Years of Transatlantic Cooperation in PNR Infor-
mation Management, THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI NATIONAL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT LAW RE-
VIEW, 114, 120 et seq. (2012). 
66  Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing and 
transfer of Passenger Name Record data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Securi-
ty, O.J. 2004, L 183/84. 
67  ECJ, judgment May 30, 2006 (PNR) – C-317/04 – m.n. 56.   
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munity law.68  Against this background, there are good arguments that at least the trans-
fer of personal data by companies for investigative purposes of law enforcement author-
ities should be outside the scope of the law of the European Communities and, thus, 
cannot be justified under Section 4b(1) FDPA.69 Consequently, such data transfer 
would be subject to the stricter requirements under Section 4b(2) FDPA. Pursuant to 
this provision, data transfers to recipients located in the EU or the EEA “when effected 
outside of activities which fall in part or in their entirety within the scope of the law of 
the European Communities” are also subject to Section 4b(1) FDPA.  In addition, how-
ever, the provision states that such “transfer shall not be effected in so far as the data 
subject has a legitimate interest in excluding transfer, in particular if an adequate level of 
data protection is not guaranteed”.70 As this standard equally applies to data transfers to 
recipients located in so-called Third Countries, it shall be discussed below (see B. below). 
 
2. Statutory Authorizations as Applicable in a Domestic Context 
 
In addition to the requirements outlined above and by reference to Sections 28 et seq. 
FDPA,71 data transfers to recipients located in EU or EEA Member States must also 
meet the criteria applicable in a domestic context. Hence, the purpose for which the data 
is transferred must correspond to one or more of the purposes explicitly specified in 
these provisions (including criminal prosecution, averting threats to state or public secu-
rity, and the protection of the legitimate interests of the company or a third party) and 
the additional requirements (necessity and balancing of interests) have to be met (see 
II.B. above). 
 
B. Regulatory or Law Enforcement Authorities located in Third Countries 
 
Section 4b(2) FDPA provides the legal framework for cross-border data transfers to 
both recipients located in EU or EEA Member States, such transfer falling “outside of 
activities which fall in part or in their entirety within the scope of the law of the Europe-
an Communities” (see III.A.1.) above), and to recipients located in non-EU and 
non-EEA countries (so-called Third Countries), prima facie irrespective of the nature of 
the data to be transferred. In doing so, it establishes even stricter requirements for such 
data transfers compared to the requirements applicable in a EU- or EEA-internal context 
			
68  ECJ, judgment May 30, 2006 (PNR) – C-317/04 – m.n. 57 and 60; see also Valentin M. Pfisterer, PNR in 2011: 
Recalling Ten Years of Transatlantic Cooperation in PNR Information Management, THE UNIVERSITY OF 
MIAMI NATIONAL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT LAW REVIEW, 114, 123 (2012). 
69   This notwithstanding, representatives of the German data protection authorities have indicated that they 
would look at the business activity of the company only which, as mentioned above, should usually fall with-
in the scope of the law of the (former) European Communities and, therefore, within the scope of the DPD 
and Section 4b FDPA. 
70  Section 4b(2) FDPA. 
71  Section 4b(1) FDPA. 
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(such transfer falling within the area of the first pillar of the EU).72 Pursuant to this 
provision, data transfers to recipients located in Third Countries are generally also sub-
ject to the requirements applicable in a EU- or EEA-internal context.  In addition, how-
ever, Section 4b(2) FDPA states that such “transfer shall not be effected in so far as the 
data subject has a legitimate interest in excluding transfer, in particular if an adequate 
level of data protection is not guaranteed”.  
 
1. Prerequisite Requirements: Precedence Rule and Limited Scope of Applica-
bility 
 
By reference to Section 4b(1) FDPA, data transfers to Third Countries are subject to the 
precedence rule and the limited scope of applicability as is the case for EU- or EEA-
internal data transfers. Similar to what was discussed above, this requirement raises two 
potential pitfalls to companies willing to comply with an informal request from a Third 
Country authority (see A.1.) above). 
  
Precedence rule. The transfer of personal data to recipients located in Third Countries 
has to be effected “in accordance with the laws and agreements applicable to such trans-
fer” such laws and agreements, if applicable, taking precedence over data transfers based 
on the FDPA.73 If, in a given case, such a treaty is applicable, the FDPA no longer serves 
as a suitable legal base for a transfer of personal data. 
  
Limited scope of applicability. Further, by reference to the requirements applicable in a 
EU- or EEA-internal context, cross-border data transfers to recipients located in Third 
Countries are only admissible with regard to “activities which fall in part or in their 
entirety within the scope of the law of the European Communities”.74 As a consequence, 
any data transfer to occur in the area of foreign and security policy or police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, as opposed to the area of economic and trade coopera-
tion, is out of scope and may not be based on Section 4b(2) FDPA.75  Data transfers in 
these areas typically occur based on treaties on legal and administrative assistance 
(“MLATs”).76 Examples are the U.S.-Germany MLAT from 200377 or the so-called 			
72  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 14-17 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 38-40 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014).  The requirements and conditions for transfers of 
personal data to Third Countries are extensively regulated in Article 44 et seq. GDPR.  
73  Section 4b(1) FDPA.   See LUTZ BERGMANN, ROLAND MÖHRLE &ARMIN HERB, BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 
24 (loose-leaf booklet ed. 2014); Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 40 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014); 
Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 12 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
74  Section 4b(2) read in connection with Section 4b(1) FDPA. 
75  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 11 and 14 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, 
in BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 33 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
76  LUTZ BERGMANN, ROLAND MÖHRLE & ARMIN HERB, BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 24; Detlev Gabel, in 
BDSG, Section 4b m.n. 12 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013). 
77  See Treaties and other international Acts Series 09-1018, Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between the United 
States of America and Germany, October 14, 2003 (www.state.gov/documents/organization/188782.pdf). 
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U.S.-EU Umbrella Agreement from 201578 which both, notably enough, allow for the 
exchange of personal data between law enforcement authorities as opposed to between 
private sector companies based in one country and a public authority of another coun-
try.79 As to the qualification of a given activity as falling within or outside the scope of 
Community law, it is unclear which activity should be taken into account in this context 
– the business activities of the company or the investigative activities of the regulatory or 
law enforcement authorities to which the company is supposed to contribute by trans-
ferring the data.  There are, however, good arguments that at least the transfer of per-
sonal data by companies for investigative purposes of  law enforcement authorities lo-
cated in Third Countries should be perceived as falling outside the scope of the law of 
the European Communities and, thus, cannot be justified under Section 4b(2) FDPA 
(see A.1.) above). This is consistent with a statement made by EU Commissioner of Jus-
tice, Vera Jourova: “The Commission's view is that personal data held by private compa-
nies in the EU should not, in principle, be directly accessed by or transferred to foreign 
enforcement authorities outside of formal channels of cooperation, such as for example the 
Mutual Legal Assistance treaties (MLATs).”80 
 
2. Adequate Level of Data Protection 
 
In addition, cross-border transfers to recipients located in Third Countries are generally 
inadmissible to the extent that the “data subject has a legitimate interest” in keeping his 
data confidential which is deemed to be the case if the Third Country does not afford an 
“adequate level of data protection”.81 Such adequacy is assessed in light of all attendant 
circumstances. Particular consideration is given to the nature of the data, the purpose, 
the duration of the proposed data processing operation, the country of origin, the recip-
ient country and the legal norms, professional rules and security measures which apply 
to the recipient.82 By virtue of the DPD, the European Commission is authorized to find 
that a certain Third Country ensures an adequate level of protection within the meaning 			
78  Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the Protection of Personal 
Information relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection, and Prosecution of Criminal Offenses.  Also 
see the corresponding Fact Sheet, MEMO/15/5612 (europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-15-5612_de.htm). 
79  The requirements set forth in the FDPA may correspond to those established in Article 47 GDPR.  Any 
judgment of a court or tribunal and any decision of an administrative authority of a Third Country requiring 
a controller or processor to transfer or disclose personal data may only be recognized or enforceable in any 
manner if based on an international agreement, such as a mutual legal assistance treaty in force between the 
requesting Third Country and the Union or a Member State, without prejudice to other grounds for transfer 
pursuant to Article 44 et seq. GDPR. 
80  Parliamentary Questions, Answer given by Ms. Jourova on behalf of the European Commission, March 4, 
2015 (www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2014-010602&language=EN).  
81  Section 4b(2) Sent. 2 FDPA. As to the adequacy criterion, see Paul M. Schwartz, The EU-U.S. Privacy Colli-
sion: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1966, 1979-1992 (2013); Nikhil S. Pale-
kar, Privacy Protection: When is “Adequate” actually Adequate?, DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, 549 et seq. (2007/08).  
82  Section 4b(3) FDPA. For transfers based on an adequacy decision by the Commission (and the criteria which 
taken into account), see Article 45 GDPR. 
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of the DPD.83 Based thereon, the European Commission has taken a number of adequa-
cy decisions84 including with respect to the U.S., although not generally but rather lim-
ited to certain contexts such as the transfer of PNR data (in connection with the current 
PNR Agreement)85 or of account data (in connection with the SWIFT Agreement).86 
Only recently, however, in its Safe Harbor decision, the ECJ struck down an adequacy 
decision by the European Commission in relation to the U.S. highlighting the uncon-
trolled mass surveillance of personal data by U.S. government agencies.87 In its decision, 
the ECJ further emphazised that national data protection authorities may independently 
examine whether or not the level of data protection afforded in the recipient’s home 
jurisdiction is adequate—even where the European Commission has adopted an ade-
quacy decision in respect of the relevant country.88 Also, in addition to the level of data 
protection, other aspects may qualify as a legitimate interest and consequently exclude a 
cross-border data transfer. It may therefore be relevant whether or not the requesting 
Third Country authority, under the rules and regulations applicable to it, is legally enti-
tled to collect the relevant data, whether or not the information request is otherwise 
lawful or unlawful, or, again, whether or not the requesting Third Country authority 
has formal means at its disposal to request and obtain the relevant data.89 In addition, it 
might also be relevant whether the concerned individual is a suspect, a potential witness 
or a person not involved in the wrongdoing being investigated (see II.B.4.) above).90 
 
In cases where no adequate level of protection is provided for, or where the data subject 
has another legitimate interest in keeping his data undisclosed, Section 4b(2) FDPA 
cannot serve as a legal basis for a data transfer to a regulatory or law enforcement author-
ity, subject to a number of explicitly specified exemptions discussed below (see 4. be-			
83  Article 25(6) DPD. 
84  See ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/international-transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm. 
85  See Article 19 of the Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the use 
and transfer of passenger name records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, O.J. 2012, 
L215/5.  For additional detail on the 2012 PNR Agreement, see Valentin M. Pfisterer, PNR in 2011: Recalling 
Ten Years of Transatlantic Cooperation in PNR Information Management, THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI 
NATIONAL SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT LAW REVIEW, 114, 131 (2012). 
86  See Article 6 of the (Second) Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on 
the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, O.J. 2010, L8/11.  For additional detail on the (Second) 
SWIFT Agreement, see Valentin M. Pfisterer, The Second SWIFT Agreement Between the European Union 
and the United States of America – An Overview, GERMAN LAW JOURNAL, 1173, 1182-1187 (2010).  
87  ECJ, Judgment of October 6, 2015 (Schrems) – C-362/14 – m.n. 105; as to this decision and its consequences for 
transatlantic data transfers, see Christian Galetzka & Kevin Rodler, Goodbye Safe Harbor USA? – Daten-
transfer in die USA nach der Safe Harbor-Entscheidung des EuGH, COMPLIANCE BERATER, 470 et seq. 
(2015). 
88  ECJ, Judgment of October 6, 2015 (Schrems) – C-362/14 – m.n. 66. 
89  Representatives of the German data protection authorities have indicated that they consider the existence of a 
mutual legal assistance treaty, and therefore an “official” channel for the requesting authority to request and 
obtain the relevant data, as a relevant factor in this context.   
90  In particular in the case of an uninvolved person, her interest in not getting involved in the “mills” of the 
judicial system of a Third Country might qualify as a relevant criterion. 
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low). 
 
3. Statutory Authorizations as Applicable in a Domestic Context 
 
In addition to meeting the prerequisite requirements and the recipient affording an 
adequate level of data protection (and the data subject not having another legitimate 
interest in keeping his data undisclosed) as outlined above, by reference to Section 4b(1) 
FDPA (and, ultimately, to Sections 28 et seq. FDPA),91 data transfers to recipients locat-
ed in Third Countries must fulfill the criteria applicable in a domestic context.  Hence, 
the purpose for which the data is transferred must correspond to one or more of the 
purposes explicitly specified in these provisions (including criminal prosecution, avert-
ing threats to state or public security, and the protection of the legitimate interests of the 
company or a third party) and the additional requirements (necessity and balancing of 
interests) have to be met (see II.B. above). 
 
4. Specific Statutory Exemptions for Data Transfers to Third Countries not Af-
fording an Adequate Level of Data Protection 
 
The FDPA stipulates a number of specific exemptions from the general prohibition of 
the cross-border transfer of personal data to a Third Country in cases where such Third 
Country does not afford an adequate level of data protection (Section 4c(1) FDPA).92 
These exemptions are fairly limited in scope.93  
 
Limited scope of applicability. The exemptions for data transfers to Third Countries not 
affording an adequate level of data protection are only available “in connection with 
activities which fall in part or in their entirety within the scope of the law of the Europe-
an Communities”.94 As discussed above, it is unclear which activity should be taken into 
account in this context. There are, however, good arguments that at least the transfer of 
personal data by companies for investigative purposes of law enforcement authorities 
located in Third Countries should be perceived as falling outside the scope of the law of 
the European Communities and, thus, cannot be justified under Section 4c(1) FDPA 
(see II.B. above).   
 
As to the specific exemptions, in addition to the data subject’s consent,95 the data trans-
fer is, inter alia,  permissible if the transfer is necessary on “important public interest 			
91  Section 4b(1) FDPA. 
92  For the requirements and limits of a data transfer in the absence of an adequacy decision, see Article 49 
GDPR. 
93  Article 29 Working Party, Working Document on a mutual understanding of Article 26 (1) of the Directive 
95/46/E, 24. Oktober 1995, WP 114, 25. November 2005, p. 9; see also  Spiros Simitis, in BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 
20 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
94  Section 4c(1) FDPA.  
95  For the requirements of an effective consent, see II.A. above.  
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grounds” or for the “establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims in court”.96 
 
Important public interest grounds. The term “important public interest grounds” is not 
defined or otherwise rendered more precisely in the FDPA or the DPD. Based on the 
wording, the term is, on the one hand, broader than the term “for averting threats to 
state or public security” used in Section 28 FDPA as it does not necessarily require a 
threat of the mentioned sort. On the other hand, the term is narrower as not all public 
interest grounds are sufficient but only “important” ones. Investigations of merely ad-
ministrative offences, as opposed to criminal offences, for example, may not be of suffi-
cient importance to establish the necessary public interest. Further, pursuant to the 
Article 29 Working Party, a unilateral decision by the requesting authority does not per 
se qualify as relevant important public interest, and it is not to the requesting authority 
to decide independently whether or not its interest qualifies as an important public 
interest within this meaning.97 The reasoning of the Article 29 Working Party is as fol-
lows: “On this point the drafters of the Directive clearly did envisage that only important 
public interests identified as such by the national legislation applicable to data controllers 
established in the EU are valid in this connection.  Any other interpretation would make 
it easy for a foreign authority to circumvent the requirement for adequate protection in 
the recipient country laid down in Directive 95/46. On the other hand, Recital 58 of Di-
rective 95/4698 refers, with regard to this provision, to cases in which international ex-
changes of data might be necessary “between tax or customs administrations in different 
countries” or “between services competent for social security matters”. This specification, 
which appears to relate only to investigations of particular cases, explains the fact that this 
exception can only be used if the transfer is of interest to the authorities of an EU Mem-
ber State themselves, and not only to one or more public authorities in the third coun-
try.”99 Finally, and also in view of Recital 58 of the DPD, there is some dispute as to 
whether the important public interest-exemption is at all available to private companies 
and other private sector entities, given that the examples mentioned in the Recital – and 
the line of argument brought forward by the Article 29 Working Party – only refer to 
data transfers between public authorities as opposed to between private sector compa-
nies and public authorities.100 			
96   Section 4c(1) No. 4 FDPA (German-language version). 
97  Article 29 Working Party, Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26 (1) of Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114, 25 November 2005, p. 14; Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of Passen-
ger Manifest Information and other data from Airlines to the United States, WP 66, 24 October 2002, p. 6.  
In this context, the GDPR clarifies that the important reasons of public interest must be recognized in Union 
law or in the law of the Member State to which the controller is subject (Article 49(4) GDPR). 
98  Recital No. 58 of the DPD mentions “cases of international transfers of data between tax or customs admin-
istrations or between services competent for social security matters” as potential cases for the important public 
interest-exemption to apply. 
99  Article 29 Working Party, Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26 (1) of Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114, 25 November 2005, p. 15. 
100  See on the one hand: Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 10 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); 
on the other hand: Wolfgang Däubler, in BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 8 (Wolfgang Däubler, Thomas Klebe, Peter 
Wedde & Thilo Weichert, 4th ed. 2014).  
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Establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims in court. The FDPA also allows for data 
transfers to Third Countries not affording an adequate level of data protection for pur-
poses of the “establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims in court”.101 While the ex-
emption applies to and allows for data transfers in connection with all sorts of court 
proceedings, it is not applicable in administrative and other out-of-court proceedings. 
Therefore, based on its wording, the provision does not allow for data transfers in con-
nection with investigations by regulatory and law enforcement authorities prior to, or 
entirely unrelated to, any such court proceedings.102 Further, pursuant to the Article 29 
Working Party, this exemption is only available “if the rules governing criminal or civil 
proceedings applicable to this type of international situation have been complied with, 
notably as they derive from the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 18 March 1970 
(“Taking of Evidence” Convention) and of 25 October 1980 (“Access to Justice” Conven-
tion).”103 
 
Additional requirements: necessity and balancing of interests.  In both cases, data trans-
fers on important public interest grounds and for the establishment, exercise or defense 
of legal claims in court, the data transfer must be “necessary” for the pursuit of the rele-
vant objective.104 In this respect, as discussed above, a data transfer is only permissible 
where the information request of the Third Country authority cannot be satisfied by 
less intrusive means including by formal channels of administrative or legal cooperation 
(see II.B.4. and III.A.1. and B.2. above). 
 
Statutory authorizations as applicable in a domestic context. Finally, in addition to meet-
ing the above-mentioned requirements, data transfers to recipients located in Third 
Countries not affording an adequate level of data protection must fulfill the criteria 
applicable in a domestic context.105 Hence, the purpose for which the data is transferred 
must correspond to one or more of the purposes explicitly specified in these provisions 
(including criminal prosecution, averting threats to state or public security, and the 
protection of the legitimate interests of the company or a third party) and the additional 
requirements (necessity and balancing of interests) have to be met (see II.B. above). 			
101  Section 4c(1) No. 4 FDPA (German-language version). 
102  Interestingly enough, the authorized English-language versions of both the DPD and the FDPA do not 
contain the addition “in court”.  This inconsistency has caused and continues to cause significant uncertainty 
with respect to the applicability of the relevant provision to administrative or similar out-of-court proceed-
ings. 
 The addendum “in court” does not appear in Article 49 (1) e) GDPR.  Under the GDPR, this exemption may 
consequently allow for German companies and individuals to transfer personal data for the purpose of the es-
tablishment of legal claims or legal defenses, including in administrative and other out-of-court proceedings. 
103  Article 29 Working Party, Working document on a common interpretation of Article 26 (1) of Directive 
95/46/EC of 24 October 1995, WP 114, 25 November 2005, p. 15. 
104  Section 4c(1) No. 4 FDPA. 
105  Detlev Gabel, in BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 4 (Jürgen Taeger & Detlev Gabel, 2nd ed. 2013); Spiros Simitis, in 
BDSG, Section 4c m.n. 6 (Spiros Simitis, 8th ed. 2014). 
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5. Specific Permit by Competent Data Protection Authority 
 
Lastly, the FDPA allows for the cross-border transfer of personal data to Third Coun-
tries, irrespective of whether or not affording an adequate level of data protection, based 
on a specific permit by the competent German data protection authority.106  According-
ly, the competent German data protection authority may authorize individual transfers 
or certain categories of transfers of personal data to bodies located in Third Countries if 
the controller guarantees adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of privacy 
and the exercise of the corresponding rights.107 This approach obviously requires that 
the company asks for and is granted adequate safeguards from the requesting Third 
Country authority, informs the competent German data protection authority of the 
envisaged data transfer in order to obtain the necessary permit, and is granted the re-
quested permit. This option may oftentimes not be available for the corporate entity 
concerned, given that a public authority is generally unlikely to contractually assure a 
certain treatment of the relevant data, in particular in an investigation context. 
 
IV. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
 
  Corporate entities based in Germany which face an informal request from a German or 
foreign regulatory or law enforcement authority for the transfer of personal data will 
typically be inclined to comply with such an informal request, given the variety of po-
tential adverse consequences of non-cooperation including fines, sanctions, loss of co-
operation credit, and negative media coverage. In certain cases, however, compliance of 
the corporate entity with such an informal request may itself entail a compliance risk, 
constitute a breach by the corporate entity of the laws applicable to it, and result in 
criminal prosecution, administrative sanctions, or damage claims and other actions by 
third party individuals. In this context and in relation to requested transfers of personal 
data, the data protection laws applicable in Germany, particularly the FDPA, are espe-
cially important to be taken into consideration.  
 
The FDPA establishes a complex and strict regime for the transfer of personal data to 
recipients, including regulatory and law enforcement authorities, both in Germany and 
abroad. The requirements for data transfers to German regulatory and law enforcement 
authorities are already rather strict. This is even more true for data transfers to regulato-
ry and law enforcement authorities located in EU or EEA Member States or even in 			
106  Section 4c(2) FDPA. 
107  Section 4c(2) FDPA.  For additional detail, see Philipp C. Räther & Nicolai Seitz, Übermittlung personenbezo-
gener Daten in Drittstaaten – Angemessenheitsklausel, Safe Harbor und die Einwilligung, MULTIMEDIA 
UND RECHT, 425 et seq. (2002) and Philipp C. Räther & Nicolai Seitz, Ausnahmen bei Datentransfer in 
Drittstaaten - Die beiden Ausnahmen nach § 4c Abs. 2 BDSG: Vertragslösung und Code of Conduct, MUL-
TIMEDIA UND RECHT, 520 et seq. (2002).  
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Third Countries. Particularly strict requirements apply to data transfers to recipients, 
including regulatory and law enforcement authorities, located in Third Countries which 
do not afford an adequate level of data protection, especially where the data are trans-
ferred for criminal prosecution and similar not strictly business-related purposes. 
 
In the past, companies facing an informal request for the transfer of personal data by a 
public authority may have considered compliance with German data protection laws a 
minor priority, especially when approached by authorities from Third Countries. In 
view of what is stated in the Yates Memorandum108, this may be particularly true in the 
context of DOJ or SEC investigations. Also, sanctions in Germany, if any, were usually 
considered soft in comparison to the fear of much more severe sanctions in Third Coun-
tries including the U.S.  As of the entry into force of the GDPR in May 2018, however, 
this is likely to change. Based on the GDPR, once applicable, the competent national 
data protection authorities will be authorized to impose fines in the event of a violation 
of the GDPR in the amount of up to EUR 20 Million or 4% of the average worldwide 
annual sales of a company.109 
			
108  DOJ, Office of the Deputy Attorney general, Yates Memorandum, September 9, 2015 
(www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download), p. 3. 
109  Article 83(6) GDPR. 
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   The Munich Compliance Talk entitled “Legal Privilege – What is its use actually 
about?” took place on April 26th, 2016 at the Literaturhaus Munich. At this event, which 
has been organized together by the Deutschen AnwaltSpiegel – Gruppe and Recom-
mind, compliance professionals, namely lawyers, employees of in-house legal depart-
ments, compliance officers and compliance managers have been present. The conference 
program included impulsive lectures by the experts Dr. Burkhard Schmitt1 (Vice Presi-
dent, Head of EMEIA Compliance at Fujitsu, Munich) and Patrick Späth2, LL.M. (Coun-
sel of WilmerHale in Berlin). Emphasis was – among other things - placed on the legal 
framework of legal privilege. Moreover the focus was on the company´s point of view, 
thus the question, how to deal with legal privilege in the company. 
 
The opening was made by the compliance officer of Fujitsu, Dr. Burkhard Schmitt. He 
spoke about the interests concerned by legal privilege and the aims pursued by means of 
legal privilege. Furthermore he orated about the legal framework of legal privilege. 
Thereby he started with two examples from current case law, which deal with the problem 
of legal seizure of investigation reports in a company, which itself has previously commis-
sioned those reports by extern law firms. In doing so he raised the question whether the 
seizure has been lawful or not, but in the first instance this question remained unan-
swered. In order to put explanations regarding the accompanying clashing interests first, 
one should for instance be aware of the collision of the affected companies´ interests and 
those interests of the individual or of the state. Moreover the striving for substantive truth 
on the one hand and procedural guarantees on the other hand would be opposed. Besides 
internal investigations would pursue different aims than the state´s investigations. 
 
As regards legal privilege, the legal problem would be focused on the guarantee of free 
communication between the suspect and his defense counsel (§ 148 StPO), as well as on 
the associated right to refuse to give evidence and correlative confiscation bans (§ 97 StPO 
in conjunction with § 53 StPO). However, the confiscation of the suspect´s notifications 
being in the custody of a person who has got the right to refuse to give evidence, i.e. the 
defense counsel, an attorney or a notary, would be prohibited, but, so said Dr. Schmitt, 
this would according to the new legal framework not apply – subject to § 53a StPO – for 
the in-house counsel regarding those information, that was entrusted to him in that ca-
pacity. Whereas his work products would, according to the jurisdiction of the LG Mann-
heim be protected by § 148 StPO. Moreover § 148 StPO would as well apply in relations 
between the company und its attorney. To round off his speech the referee then answered 
the questions that he asked at the beginning. The investigation report would be covered 
by § 148 StPO – that is what the LG Braunschweig ruled – as far as it has been created for 
needs of defense.  
 			
1
  Vice President, Head of EMEIA Compliance at Fujitsu: burkhard.schmitt@ts.fujitsu.com. 
2
  Counsel at Wilmer Hale: patrick.spaeth@wilmerhale.com 
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The attorney Patrick Späth then took up the company´s point of view. At the beginning 
of his speech he laid down that companies regularly deal with the question, whether they 
really “want” legal privilege. In doing so he made reference to the motto of the event “Le-
gal Privilege – What is its use actually about?”. As cooperation with the prosecution au-
thorities would be considered positively, the companies should think carefully about their 
conduct towards the prosecution authorities, even if legal privilege is the companies´ un-
deniable right. If one pursued legal privilege, the clarification of the intern communica-
tion issues in the company would be decisive. It would fundamentally be recommendable 
to limit the communication to few employees only as well as to limit the written commu-
nication if possible. Moreover it might be necessary to acquire specific legal expertise in 
cases of doubt and there should always be an extern attorney present when it comes to 
employee interviews. 
 
The subsequent closing discussion broached the issue of whether companies had the ob-
ligation to decrypt data that has been encrypted by the company for safety reasons, if re-
quired by prosecution authorities. Agreement was reached that there would not be such 
an obligation in case of an existing confiscation ban, while, conversely, i.e. there is no con-
fiscation ban, decoding would have to be performed. Besides referring to this the differ-
ence between duties to tolerate and active obligations to cooperate were discussed. Fur-
thermore the question, whether within the scope of employee interviews, which should 
only be hold in the presence of an attorney, an intern attorney would be hold sufficient 
or an extern attorney would be considered to be preferable, came up. The speakers 
deemed with respect to the still contradicting jurisdiction on such cases hiring an extern 
attorney as preferable as this would guarantee greater and safer protection. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
   Supply chain management—the design, planning, coordination, and monitoring of, 
supplies, goods, services, and information as they move through the chain from supplier 
to manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer to consumer—is extremely important yet ex-
ceedingly difficult for large global corporations.  One of the many intricate and complex 
challenges of it is ensuring that a supply chain possesses adequate ethics and compliance 
programs at every tier of the chain. This piece describes the journey of a student on a 
LawWithoutWalls (“LWOW”) team that was charged with helping a large multination-
al defense firm, Lockheed Martin, solve this problem.  This piece is not designed to 
teach the reader about supply chain management; instead, it will exemplify through a 
real-life experience how tough it is to teach people who are not compliance experts 
about the field’s complexities and, further, explore the difficulty in developing creative, 
practicable solutions to compliance problems. 
 
II. BACKDROP 
 
  My journey into the world of compliance began with an unconventional approach: 
instead of a lecture, textbook, or class, I took part in LWOW, a cross-disciplinary, cross-
cultural part-virtual experiential learning program designed to change the way lawyers 
and business professionals collaborate to solve problems.  LWOW is offered to lawyers 
at firms and to law and business school students at more than 30 schools around the 
world (including the University of Miami, where I am in my final year of JD study). 
LWOW places 3 students from different schools on a team with two lawyer leaders and 
3 mentors (an academic, an entrepreneur, and a business professional). Each multidisci-
plinary, multicultural team is provided a topic and challenged to explore and source a 
discreet problem from that topic, and, finally, create a solution to that problem. These 
topics are issues facing the legal market today. My team’s topic focused on compliance. 
Specifically, our topic was: “Catch 22?: Assessing the Ethics Programs of M&A Targets, 
Partners, and Suppliers Without Reference to a Specific Country’s Laws or Regula-
tions.” Lockheed Martin sponsored this topic and provided us with exceptional guid-
ance through one of their employees, who served as our business mentor. LawWith-
outWalls’ novel approach—combining innovation, teaming, mentorship, and expertise 
from a multinational facing this compliance hurtle—provided our team with great per-
spective and drive to discover a solution.  
 
I thought that discovering a solution would be easy. Looking back, I couldn’t have been 
more wrong. Even with a team full of critical thinkers, experienced businesspeople, and 
compliance experts—all committed to innovating a solution—every step was harder 
than I imagined. Navigating the world of compliance, understanding the complexities 
within, and identifying a narrow problem to solve all proved difficult. The biggest diffi-
culty was creating an implementable solution. This difficulty, however, proved to be the 
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biggest benefit of the entire journey. Through LWOW, I learned that not finding a 
solution does not equate to failure; rather, through our research, interviews, and count-
less rounds of going back to the drawing board, we—the students, lawyer leaders, and 
mentors alike—honed skills critical to twenty-first century professional success: com-
munication, project management, cultural competency, teamwork, leadership, and 
business acumen. We also gained an understanding of and appreciation for the complex-
ities of supply chain compliance. 
 
III. MY JOURNEY AND PROJECT 
 
A. Meeting My Team and Exploring our Topic 
 
In January 2016, I met my team at IE University in Madrid, Spain at the LWOW Kick-
Off, a two-day event designed to teach innovation, teaming, presentation, and collabo-
ration skills and lay the foundation for the virtual teamwork that would follow. There 
were three students on my team: an American from MiamiLaw; an Italian at Bucerius 
Law School in Hamburg, Germany, a French business and law student at École HEAD 
in Paris; and myself, a law student from the University of Miami. We had the privilege 
of being led and mentored by five amazing professionals, including: Lauren Schultz, an 
Ethics Analyst at Lockheed Martin; Mark Snyderman, the Chief Ethics & Compliance 
Officer and Assistant General Counsel at Laureate Education; Anna Donovan, UCL 
Law Professor and LWOW alum; Camilla Eliott-Lockhard, a senior associate at Ever-
sheds; Nataia Clements, Legal Counsel at Citibank; and Vasco Bilbao-Bastida, another 
LWOW alum and Group Director and Digital Strategist at VaynerMedia. Both as a 
group and individually (given their varying expertise, experience, and interests), our 
mentors guided our progress, pushed us for answers, encouraged us to think critically, 
and offered constructive feedback as we devised our solution prototype and financial 
model. 
 
Quickly, our team realized that, in spite of how cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural we 
were, the conversation on compliance would be a challenge for all. The differences be-
tween laws, policies, and what was considered “the norm” across countries quickly be-
came evident. For example, in the United States, if an employer has an employee tip 
hotline to report a harassment incident, that report requires anonymous reporting by 
law. In other words, confidentiality is of the utmost importance, and is required by law. 
This is not the case in Europe, especially in the United Kingdom, where the thought of 
anonymous reporting is unheard of. It was within the first few moments and introduc-
tory conversations that I began to understand the scope and depth of the challenge 
ahead.  
 
Our team spent the remainder of the KickOff weekend laying the foundation for the 
three and a half months to come. Together, we learned from thought leaders engaged in 
exercises to develop our teaming skills, created and presented an idea in a mini-
hackathon, learned how to market ourselves, explored cultural competencies, net-
worked, and more. Once we left Madrid (and returned to Miami, Paris, Hamburg, 
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London, etc.), the real work began: unpacking the topic, identifying a narrow problem 
within it, and developing an implementable solution to that problem –virtually. 
 
B. Narrowing the Focus 
 
It quickly became apparent that our project was no small feat, and we needed to narrow 
our topic down as much as possible. Lockheed Martin had provided us with a very 
comprehensive understanding of both its philosophy and corporate structure. Lockheed 
Martin, like many multinationals, is always looking to expand their suppliers, business 
partners, and targets outside of the United States, as well as develop effective, efficient 
compliance solutions to accompany a growing supply chain. 
 
With Lockheed Martin’s support, we felt it most efficient to focus on the defense indus-
try. We wanted to create something practical that Lockheed Martin (and its competi-
tors) could use. However, after about six weeks of focusing on the defense industry, and 
a long team meeting, we came to the conclusion that targeting the defense industry was 
not the best option for us. The defense industry is unique as there are only a few big 
players; e.g., Boeing Further, concerns over confidentiality proved significant obstacles 
in investigating the defense industry’s supply chain. The starting over was difficult. But, 
as we learned through the LWOW experience, starting over is a normal part of the inno-
vation and design thinking process. The pathway to innovation, much like the pathway 
to ensuring compliance within a large, global corporation, is messy, complex, and diffi-
cult—a lesson we learned the messy, complex, and difficult way. 
 
When starting over, we returned our focus to the overarching topic: supply chain man-
agement as it relates to legal and ethical compliance along the chain from the point of 
origin to eventual consumer.  Our research indicated that (regardless of industry) many 
compliance measures related to suppliers at the point of origin were in place because of 
the supplier, manufacturer, or seller’s fear of financial loss—that is, these measures are 
generally reactive, rather than proactive. With that knowledge in mind, we then turned 
to the parties of the supply chain, and found that due to the global nature of supply 
chains across several industries, laws and regulations across the globe most commonly 
and heavily impacted suppliers. 
 
In investigating supply chains, we came across several discoveries. First, chains are often 
complex and multi-tiered. The end seller is often unaware of who their middle- and 
bottom-tier suppliers are. These middle- and bottom-tier suppliers are often small- and 
medium-sized suppliers, such as “mom and pop shops,” or suppliers located in a single 
warehouse, employing 20 people, and making only one specific part. Because these sup-
pliers are not likely known by the entity at the top of the chain, they have little to no 
relationship with each other, and generally do not have a mandated or standard compli-
ance program that dictates appropriate standards. This is because the relationship be-
tween the middle and bottom tier suppliers and the ultimate end-buyer at the other end 
of the supply chain is attenuated and there are many barriers to developing a compliance 
program in these small enterprises that may not have an internal need for such a pro-
gram let alone the internal resources to design, implement, monitor, and enforce it. 
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The complexity goes beyond supply chain structure. In addition to not having compli-
ance programs in place, suppliers were not held to a common standard across jurisdic-
tions.  In an attempt to find some commonality, we compared six international stand-
ards, including the Defense Industry Initiative, United Nations Global Compact, Or-
ganization for Economics Co-operation and Development, International Code Council: 
Rules on Combating Corruption, United Kingdom Bribery Act, and the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. Our analysis showed that no true global standard—let alone a 
general list of commonalities across standards—exists. In our discussions with Lockheed 
Martin, large defense players and contractors are eager to develop a uniform standard 
that flows across borders, governing treaties, and enterprises of all sizes. 
 
C. Project Development 
 
Although this discovery was daunting, it was our opportunity for innovation.  As is part 
of our charge in LawWithoutWalls and important for any innovation journey, we 
found a gap – a real need –to be filled. From this moment on, we focused on this gap—
the lack of a global standard—and decided to try our hand at designing how a global 
standard might look, and, further, how small- and medium-sized suppliers could adopt, 
implement, and enforce these standards when no current ethics and compliance pro-
gram exists. 
 
1. Research Methodology and Results 
 
We began by attempting to define a global standard. As a foundation, we compared the 
six global standards noted above. Our comparison showed that, while no global stand-
ard existed, six common elements were present among them: 
  
i. Reporting Mechanism, i.e., some tool in place to allow employees to inform 
management or their boss(es) of any issue they come across. 
ii. Communication Plan & Awareness Training, which allows everyone within 
the company to know what the company’s policy is and training on that 
policy. 
iii. Program Assessment & Evaluation, which ensures that the company’s poli-
cy is current and up-to-date.  
iv. Essential Risk Covered, which includes proprietary information and a plan 
in place if such information is leaked. 
v. Leadership Commitment & Core Company Values, which allows compa-
ny’s to focus on the collective where everyone is aware of the company’s po-
sitions. 
vi. Ethics Driven Code of Conduct, which demonstrates that the company is 
committed to combating corruption, bribery, and fraud.  
 
2. Research Gaps and What Went Wrong 
 
While we identified these six common elements, we thereafter recognized that discrep-
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ancies and differences in interpretation of each prevented a concrete conclusion. For 
example, Leadership Commitment & Core Company Values to one company in one 
jurisdiction may simply be a statement on a website stating “X Company is Committed 
to a Compliant Supply Chain,” while in another jurisdiction, this statement may not be 
sufficient enough, and said jurisdiction may require a statement and explanation to 
appear in a company’s Code of Conduct.  
  
Another limitation was manpower.  Although research shows that teams that are too 
large can be ineffective, in this situation, a larger cohort might have been beneficial. If a 
bigger team were to tackle this research in great—even painstaking—detail, more com-
monalities and conclusions could be drawn. We were limited from being able to do this 
but believe that with the right research plan, support, flexibility, and communication, 
this could be done in the future.  And given the need for it, the entire team hopes that it 
will come to fruition. That said, given the ever-evolving nature of laws, policies, and 
company goals, this may be difficult. An international standard would need to be readi-
ly adaptable to change. Additionally, changes in each country’s laws and regulations 
would need to be constantly monitored. A final challenge lies in measuring the veracity 
of the information on record: is it accurate, complete, up to date, and truthful? Hope-
fully, with the help of technology, many of these challenges can be overcome. 
IV. WHAT I’VE LEARNED  
 
It is impossible for a newcomer to develop expertise in compliance, let alone a fo-cused 
area like supply chain management or industry specialization, in four months’ time. I 
did, however, gain an understanding of the complexities and func-tionality of supply 
chain management, as well as the concurrent interplay of ethics and compliance. I 
learned about the influence of factors like financials, product quality, and supplier loca-
tion. Further, I gained great insight into the disconnect between the lack of a global 
standard and global corporations’ expressed desire for one. In our journey, the team 
began to question: Was this a true desire, or was it merely a well-intended wish? I am 
still not completely sure but complicating the answer is the reality that: 1) large corpora-
tions often value trade secrets and are reluctant to share their information with others; 2) 
large corporations, for various reasons, do not want to be held to a standard not of their 
own design or under their own control. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF TEAMING TOWARDS PROBLEM SOLV-
ING 
 
When I embarked on my journey into compliance and the LWOW process, I was armed 
with a blank slate and an eager desire to solve a problem. Yet, in four months, I success-
fully embraced a steep, rich, and nuanced learning curve. One of the biggest takeaways 
I’ve learned is that there is a conflict between the “should” of having a global standard, 
and the “could” and/or “would” of development and adoption. But the most important 
takeaway was the value of trying—of working to co-create a solution to one of laws’ 
problems in a multi-disciplinary, multi-cultural team.  Although we didn’t find the 
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ultimate solution to the gap we identified, we still created what LWOW so righty coins 
“a project of worth.” The LWOW journey was a training experience that most law 
school students and lawyers never have the opportunity to take part in and it was so 
worth the effort because, in the end, all of us built skills that will make us better prob-
lem solvers and team players in the future. 
